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Note
Rape, Resurrection, and the Quest for

Truth: The Law and Science of Rape
Trauma Syndrome in Constitutional
Balance With the Rights of the Accused
by
KATHRYN M. DAVIS*

Introduction
In 1974, two psychologists studying the physical and emotional
effects of rape on women coined the term rape trauma syndrome

(RTS).' Working to develop a two-stage model of recovery, Ann
Burgess and Lynda Holmstrom established RTS to identify and
describe typical post-rape behaviors experienced by victims of rape
and attempted rape.2 Since their groundbreaking study, subsequent

researchers have expanded the descriptive scope of symptoms
attributable to traumatic rape.3 Modem applications of RTS and its
variations are pervasive; even the American Psychiatric Association
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Ferdinand F. Fernandez, Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals; J.D. University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 1998. I would like to
express my deepest appreciation to Allison Morse, Sherry Skibbe, Sarah Weinstein, and
Amy Wright for their invaluable comments on earlier drafts of this Note, and to Professor
David L. Faigman for the opportunity and guidance he provided throughout this project. I
would also like to thank Brooke Holley and Koren Wong-Ervin of the Hastings Law
Journal for their editorial contributions and patience during the production process, and
especially, Michael W. Royer II, whose unending assistance, dedication, and support made
this project possible.
1. See Ann Wolbert Burgess & Lynda Lytle Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome,
131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 981 (1974).
2. See id. at 982-83.
3. See 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN ScIENTIFIc EVIDENCE: THE LAW
AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY, § 10-1.1, at 403 (1997).
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identifies rape as one of the many traumatic events that can lead to
the development of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 4
Since the emergence of syndrome evidence, courts across the
nation have struggled to define principled evidentiary boundaries of
admissibility for RTS expert testimony in rape trials. 5 RTS or raperelated PTSD expert testimony is most commonly utilized by the state
to rebut a claim of consent asserted by the accused charged with rape.
Generally, the state's expert will testify that a woman's 6 post-rape
behavior is consistent with that of other rape victims, including those
who have been diagnosed with RTS. 7
Less frequently, the
prosecution's expert will testify, based upon a personal psychological
examination of the victim, that the victim actually suffers from RTS
or rape-related PTSD. 8 Historically, juries have questioned the
inherent credibility of the female accuser in a rape prosecution.
Combating cultural myths, prosecutors also employ RTS evidence to
disabuse jurors of prejudicial misconceptions arising from a victim's
ostensibly unusual post-rape behavior. To this end, RTS testimony
plays a crucial role in educating the jury about the psychological
consequences surrounding rape and functions to dispel rape myths by
explaining counterintuitive post-rape behavior. 9 In addition, evidence
of RTS is particularly beneficial, if not essential, for rape victims in
cases where the state can produce little or no physical evidence that a
rape actually occurred. Consequently, when the accused asserts a
defense of consent, RTS may be the only evidence available to the
state proving that a woman has been raped.
Recognizing its evidentiary value, most courts have concluded
that RTS is admissible insofar as it is reliable and helpful to the factfinder in resolving issues of consent. 10 Significantly, courts that

4. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
5. See Karla Fischer, Note, Defining the Boundaries of Admissible Expert
Psychological Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 710-13.
6. The author recognizes that this Note refers only to women as victims of rape. This
characterization is not intended to diminish the fact that men are also victimized by
forcible rape. Rather, the theory of admissibility advanced herein applies to all survivors
of rape who seek justice under the law. See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Kramer. Note. When Men
are Victims: Applying Rape Shield Laws to Male Same-Sex Rape, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 293
(1998).
7. See generally 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 3, § 10-1.2.2, at 406.
8. See generallyFischer, supra note 5, at 722-23.
9. See, e.g., Aviva Orenstein, No Bad Men!: A Feminist Analysis of Character
Evidence in Rape Trials, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 663, 664-67 (1998); Bridget A. Clarke.
Comment, Making the Woman's Experience Relevant to Rape: The Admissibility of Rape
Trauma Syndrome in California, 39 UCLA L. REV. 251,274-79 (1991).
10. See Jennifer J. Hackman, Comment, Henson v. State: Rape Trauma Syndrome
Used by the Defendant as well as the Victim, 19 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 453, 458 (1995).
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previously rested theories of admissibility upon the scientific validity
of RTS research are now faced with defendants who assert the right
to employ in their defense the same social science." Some states,
while acknowledging the detrimental effect on rape victims, have
reasoned that when the prosecution introduces RTS evidence to
rebut a defense of consent, fundamental fairness requires that the
accused be permitted to proffer similar syndrome testimony. 12 At
least one state supreme court has gone even further, declaring that
defendants have the right to introduce RTS testimony concerning the
victim's sexual behavior, even when the state has declined to do so
first.13
Arguably, however, liberal admissibility of defense-sponsored
RTS evidence substantially undermines core values embodied in rape
shield legislation. Prompted by feminists and law enforcement
advocates, all but two states and the federal government have enacted
rape shield statutes designed to protect victims against the invasion of
privacy, potential embarrassment, and sexual stereotyping endured
by women who publicly prosecute rape.14 However, when the
accused is permitted to present RTS evidence in his defense, "a
psychological concept with origins in the desire to aid victims of
sexual abuse may now be employed to subject those victims to
compelled psychological examinations, and searching crossexamination regarding past sexual history."' 5 Thus, the very research
social scientists developed to overcome institutional biases endured
by rape victims for decades, is now being used by defendants to
prevent those same victims from obtaining justice. Consequently, in
seeking to preserve rape shield protections, some commentators have
contended that the accused must be categorically precluded from
16
relying on evidence of RTS.
However, unqualified exclusion of defense-sponsored RTS
evidence, while preserving core rape shield values, fails to comport
with the Sixth Amendment rights of the accused. Originally intended
to protect rape victims from a humiliating trial experience, rape shield
exclusionary rules can now be employed to strip the accused of the
11. See Susan Stefan, The Protection Racket: Rape Trauma Syndrome, Psychiatric
Labeling, and Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1271, 1324-27 (1994); Hackman, supra note 10, at
453; Nicole Rosenberg Economou, Note, Defense Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma
Syndrome: Implicationsfor the Stoic Victim, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1143,1152-57 (1991).
1992); Henson v. State, 535
12. See, e.g., People v. Wheeler, 602 N.E.2d 826, 833 (Ill.
N.E.2d 1189,1193 (Ind.1989).
13. See Henson, 535 N.E.2d at 1193-94.
14. See Peter M. Hazelton, Note, Rape Shield Laws: Limits on Zealous Advocacy, 19
AM. J. CRIM. L. 35,35-36 & n.2 (1991).
15. 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 3, § 10-1.5, at 413-14.
16. See, e.g., Economou, supra note 11.
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ability to adequately defend against the state's charge. 17
Consequently, "the rape defendant who claims consent as his defense
[now] enters the system under a cloud of guilt."' 8 Due process and
the Sixth Amendment provide that the accused in a criminal trial
shall have a fair opportunity to present complete evidence and to
fully defend against the state's accusations. 19 Absent countervailing
concerns, privacy interests of the victim in a rape trial may be
sufficient to substantially outweigh the Sixth Amendment rights of
the accused to present a complete defense. 20 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has expressly recognized that legitimate state social policy can
constitutionally justify precluding relevant evidence of the victim's
prior sexual history with the accused. 21 Nevertheless, under some
circumstances, such as when the prosecution introduces RTS
evidence to refute a defense of consent, the scales of relevance begin
to tip in favor of the constitutional rights of the accused. 22 When the
state relies upon RTS evidence, core constitutional values and
principles of adversarial fairness combine to require that the accused
be permitted to present all the essential elements of his defense.
Moreover, the unestablished scientific reliability of the social
science research methodology supporting RTS renders RTS evidence
highly relevant for the accused. 23 Currently, there is substantial
scientific disagreement regarding the nature and range of traumatic
events capable of precipitating PTSD. In addition, the present ability
of social scientists to sufficiently distinguish symptoms attributable to
rape-related PTSD from those induced by other previous traumatic
events is questionable. 24 As a result, courts will increasingly
encounter rape defendants asserting the right to establish that a
woman's post-rape behavior is inconsistent with a diagnosis of RTS,
or to prove that an alternative traumatic event, including a previous
rape, is the source of her symptoms.
The balance courts strike in determining appropriate evidentiary
boundaries for defense-sponsored use of RTS should reflect values
embodied in the United States Constitution, state rape shield laws,
and the validity of the social science research underlying RTS and
17. See Hackman, supra note 10, at 467-68.
18. Id. at 468.
19. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295
(1973).

20. See Jeffrey T. Waddle & Mark Parts, Comment, Rape Trauma Syndrome: Interest
of the Victim and Neutral Experts, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 399, 413.
21. See Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 151 (1991).

22. See Waddle & Parts, supra note 20, at 413.
23. See infra Part IV.
24. See Stefan, supra note 11, at 1324-27; see also 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 3, §
10-1.2.1, at 405-06.
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PTSD diagnoses.25 Allowing unlimited prosecutorial use of RTS
evidence while categorically precluding defendants access to the same
research is fundamentally unfair and unconstitutionally deprives
those accused of rape the right to present a complete defense. 26 On
the other hand, many courts will be cautious in admitting defensesponsored RTS testimony to the extent that such admission
undermines the protective policies preserved by rape shield laws.27
To resolve this tension, courts must formulate an approach that
carefully considers each of these important competing interests, while
methodically evaluating the validity of the social science, and
thoughtfully balancing conceptions of fairness and necessity.
As an initial proposition, this Note argues that fundamental
fairness and the Constitution require courts to permit defendants to
utilize RTS expert testimony for the purposes of rebutting a charge of
rape. When the prosecution fails to initially introduce RTS evidence,
privacy interests of the victim substantially outweigh the defendant's
constitutional rights, and the exclusion of defense-sponsored RTS
testimony is justified. 28 However, when the state opens the door to
the use of generalized or diagnostic RTS expert testimony, the
victim's psychological health becomes relevant to a constitutionally
complete defense. Under such circumstances, due process and the
Sixth Amendment demand that the accused be permitted to defend
29
himself with the same scientific tools available to the state.
Moreover, to the extent social scientists are unable to conclusively
determine the precipitating trauma leading to the development of
RTS, the victim's sexual history becomes relevant for the accused.
Taken together, these two factors render a woman's sexual behavior
extremely relevant to the defendant's ability to present a complete
defense as guaranteed by the Constitution. Thus, the state's interest
in advancing legitimate rape shield policy is substantially outweighed
by principles of adversarial fairness, scientific integrity, and the Sixth
Amendment rights of the accused to a fundamentally fair trial.
Part I of this Note briefly defines RTS and rape-related PTSD,
the social and scientific circumstances that precipitated the research,
and applications of the science to the modern legal fact-finding
context. Part II of this Note identifies and describes the types of RTS
25. See David L. Faigman, The Syndromic Lawyer Syndrome: A Psychological Theory
of Evidentiary Munificence, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 817, 823-26 & n.21 (1996); see also 1
FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 3, § 10-1.5, at 413.
26. See Henson v. State, 535 N.E.2d 1189, 1193 (Ind. 1989) ("It would be
fundamentally unfair to allow the use of such testimony by the State ... and then deny its
use by a defendant here.").
27. See Faigman, supranote 25, at 825 & n.21.
28. See Waddle & Parts, supranote 20, at 411-13.
29. See People v. Wheeler, 602 N.E.2d 826, 831-33 (111. 1992).
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and PTSD expert testimony typically utilized by the state in a rape
prosecution, as well as the theories of admissibility upon which such
use is justified. Part III explores recent case law contemplating and
permitting RTS evidence offered by the accused and anticipates
contemporary objections to admissibility. Part IV describes the status
of the social science research underlying RTS and PTSD, with
particular emphasis on methodological weaknesses and problems
with the application of syndrome evidence to the judicial fact-finding
function. Part V critically examines the relationship between rape
shield prohibitions and the constitutional rights of the accused in an
evidentiary context and discards as unconstitutional the categorical
preclusion of defense-sponsored RTS.
This Note concludes in Part VI by proposing that courts adopt a
rule of admissibility permitting the accused to employ RTS evidence
for the limited purpose of rebutting a claim of nonconsent. Unless
the victim consents to an examination by an expert of the defendant's
choice, the state should be barred from introducing RTS testimony
based on a personalized psychiatric diagnostic examination of the
victim. 30
Even scientists and commentators sympathetic to
prosecutorial use of RTS to aid survivors of rape concede that "if...
the prosecution decides to call a treating or nontreating expert to
testify about the complainant's symptoms, the defendant.., should
be entitled to a court order compelling [her] to submit to an
examination by the defendant's expert. ' 31 This Note, however, will
also emphasize that the state retains the power to preclude
defendants from exercising these potentially oppressive rights. When
the state refrains from introducing evidence of RTS, or in the
alternative, limits its use of RTS evidence to generalized consistency
testimony not based on a personalized victim examination, the
accused can be constitutionally barred from compelling an adverse
victim examination. While this proposal appears to strike at the heart
of core rape shield values, this Note argues that it is the only
principled and just solution to a vexing constitutional question.
I. Overview of Rape Trauma Syndrome
Rape trauma syndrome is a general term used by psychologists to
describe typical behavioral responses experienced by victims of
rape. 32 RTS was first coined in 1974 by two psychologists to describe
30. See id. at 833.
31. Toni M. Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape: The Rape Trauma
Syndrome Issue and Its Implications for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN. L.
REv. 395, 457 (1985); see also Wheeler, 602 N.E.2d at 830-33.
32. See 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 3, § 10-1.1, at 403. RTS has been used to
describe general post-rape behavior, the Burgess/Holmstrom two-stage model of recovery,
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a two-phase model of recovery exhibited by survivors of rape. 33

Working at a Boston hospital emergency room, Ann Burgess and
Lynda Holmstrom conducted a year-long study of the physical,
behaviorial, and psychological responses typically displayed by

women seeking treatment for rape or an attempted rape.34 Burgess
and Holmstrom concluded that the women they examined
characteristically exhibited a two-phase response to traumatic rape. 35
According to the Burgess/Holmstrom model, a woman suffering from

rape trauma syndrome initially experiences the "acute phase.

'36

This

first stage of recovery occurs in the immediate hours following the

attack and consists of at least two different stress reactions. 37
According to the model, approximately half of all women victimized
by rape exhibit an "expressive style" response, which is characterized
by overtly emotional behavior. 38 Women in this group may
experience a range of post-rape behavioral responses including
crying, sobbing, feelings of anxiety, and what may be perceived to be
"inappropriate" smiling.39 In contrast, other women may exhibit
none of these symptoms at all, suggesting that no rape has occurred.40

This group exhibits a "controlled style" and is subdued, calm, and
non-emotional. 41 Physical symptoms characteristic of this first "acute
phase" include soreness, bruising, headaches, sleeplessness, fatigue
42

and genitourinary disturbance.
The second phase of recovery, called the "long-term
reorganization" process, was experienced by all victims in the
Burgess/Holmstrom sample and is characterized by nightmares,
phobic reactions, and sexual fears. 43 Rape survivors in this stage can
manifest symptoms at various points throughout their recovery; some

and rape-related PTSD. See id.Thus, while the term RTS is frequently employed in the
legal decision-making context, its varied meanings can cause confusion. See id.
33. See Burgess & Holmstrom, supranote 1, at 981.
34. See id.
35. See id.at 982-83; see also People v. Taylor, 552 N.E.2d 131, 133-34 (N.Y. 1990)
(discussing the Burgess/Holmstrom two-stage model of victim recovery); Massaro, supra
note 31, at 424-26; Orenstein, supra note 9, at 702; Neil J. Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller,
Juriesand Expert Evidence: Social Framework Testimony, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
133, 155 (1989).
36. Burgess & Holmstrom, supra note 1, at 982.
37. See id.
38. Clarke, supranote 9, at 258.
39. Burgess & Holmstrom, supranote 1, at 982.
40. See Clarke, supra note 9, at 258.
41. Burgess & Holmstrom, supra note 1, at 982.
42. Id
43. Id. at 983-84 (explaining that other symptoms characteristic of the second recovery
stage may include increased motor activity such as taking long trips, changing address or
phone numbers, and contacting friends and family whom the victim normally does not
often see).
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may not become symptomatic for months or even years after the
rape. 44 Moreover, a woman could continue to exhibit symptoms that
45
can persist for decades, and throughout her lifetime.
Since the groundbreaking Burgess/Holmstrom study, researchers
have extensively documented commonly observed symptoms
associated
with
rape trauma
syndrome. 46
While the
Burgess/Holmstrom inquiry focused on describing stages of recovery,
more recent research has conceptualized RTS as a range of specific
symptoms characterizing a woman's physical and emotional response
to forcible rape, rather than a syndrome. 47 According to this model,
women suffering from RTS may experience depression, anxiety, guilt,
nightmares, fear of men, fear of indoors or outdoors (correlating to
the type of environment where the rape occurred), flashbacks, and
constant reliving of the traumatic event.48 Other indicia include
withdrawal, decreased sexual desire, change in eating and sleeping
habits, unease at work, and hypervigilance. 49 Studies comparing
women who have been forcibly raped with those in the general
population reveal that rape victims experience these symptoms with
much greater frequency than do nonvictims and victims of other
traumatic events. 50
In addition to the two variations of RTS described above, rape is
a traumatic event that can lead to the development of posttraumatic
stress disorder (PTSD). 51
PTSD was initially recognized by
psychologists working with veterans of the Vietnam War and was
officially defined by the American Psychiatric Association in 1980.52
Like other modern conceptualizations of RTS, the fourth edition of
the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) characterizes rape-related
PTSD as an identifiable set of stress-induced symptoms. 53 However,
44. See State v. Jones, 615 N.E.2d 713,719 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
45. See Clarke, supra note 9, at 259; see also Patricia A. Frazier & Eugene Borgida,
The Scientific Status of Research on Rape Trauma Syndrome, in 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY, § 10-2.2.1, 414, 418-21

(David L. Faigman et al. eds., 1997) (observing that lifetime prevalence rates are higher
for victims of rape than for nonvictims and victims of other trauma).
46. See Clarke, supra note 9, at 256 n.21; see also David McCord, The Admissibility of
Expert Testimony Regarding Rape Trauma Syndrome in Rape Prosecutions, 26 B.C. L.
REV. 1143, 1145-55, 1165-69 (1985).
47. See 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 3, § 10-1.1, at 403; see also Clarke, supra note 9,
at 256 & n.21; McCord, supra note 46, at 1146-49.
48. See Clarke, supra note 9, at 256-59.
49. See id. at 256.
50. See Frazier & Borgida, supra note 45, § 10-2.2.1, at 418-19.
51. See DSM-IV, supra note 4, at 424, 427-29.
52. See Hackman, supra note 10, at 455-56.
53. DSM-IV, supra note 4, at 427-29.
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unlike the traditional embodiment of RTS, which is premised on
traumatic rape, several nonrape-related traumatic events can
precipitate the onset of PTSD.54 Consequently, while RTS is often
described as a particular type of PTSD, it is more accurate to refer to
rape as a traumatic event that can result in the development of PTSD,
rather than to classify RTS as a subcategory of PTSD.55
According to the DSM-IV, the essential feature of PTSD is the
development of characteristic symptoms resulting from exposure to
an extreme traumatic stressor involving actual or threatened death or
serious injury.5 6 Specifically, to be diagnosed as suffering from raperelated PTSD, the rape victim must exhibit four post-rape behavioral
stress responses. 57 First, as a general matter, the precipitating
traumatic event causing the stress must be of sufficient magnitude to
evoke "intense fear, helplessness, or horror" in the victim. 58 Second,
the rape victim must reexperience her trauma through flashbacks or
recurrent and intrusive recollection of the rape.59 Dreams and
nightmares are common. 60 In particular, a survivor of rape may
experience nonmastery dreams in which she is unable to successfully
overpower her assailant. 6' Third, she must present at least three
avoidance and numbing symptoms. 62 Symptoms may include
avoiding activities that arouse recollection, avoiding thoughts or
feelings about the trauma, numbing of responsiveness to the
environment, reducing involvement with her environment, or feeling
63
detached from others.
In order for post-rape behavior to meet the PTSD diagnostic
criteria, two of the following increased arousal symptoms must be
present that were not present prior to the rape: (1) difficulty falling
or staying asleep; (2) irritability or outbursts of anger; (3) difficulty
concentrating; (4) hypervigilance; and (5) exaggerated startle

54. See id. at 424.
55. See 1 FAIGMAN ET AL, supra note 3, § 10-1.1, at 403. This is an important
distinction because such an erroneous classification can be misleading to the extent that
the symptoms listed in the psychiatric diagnostic manuals supporting a diagnosis of PTSD,
are not necessarily the same as those described by Burgess and Holmstrom or subsequent
research studies. See id.
56. DSM-IV, supranote 4, at 424.
57. See id. at 428.
58. IL
59. See Hackman, supra note 10, at 455; see also Cynthia F. Feagan, Rape Trauma
Syndrome Testimony As Scientific Evidence: Evolving Beyond State v. Taylor, 61 U. Mo.
KAN. C= L. REV. 145,151-52 (1992).
60. See DSM-IV, supranote 4, at 424.
61. See id.; see also Feagan, supra note 59, at 151.
62. See DSM-IV, supra note 4, at 428.
63. See Frazier & Borgida, supra note 45, § 10-2.2.1, at 417-18.
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response. 64 Although symptom duration is often not assessed in
research studies, the above symptoms must be present for at least one
month to qualify for a diagnosis of rape-related PTSD. 65 And, while
symptoms generally dissipate over time, they can persist for years
after the victim experiences the initial trauma. 66 Finally, the rape
must have caused significant distress or impairment in social,
67
occupational, or other important areas of a woman's functioning.
To summarize, the designation of RTS is used to refer not only
to the original Burgess/Holmstrom model of recovery, but also to
general post-rape behavioral responses, and the more specific
68
symptomology associated with a diagnosis of rape-related PTSD.
While a woman's post-rape behavior may fail to meet the diagnostic
criteria necessary for PTSD, she may still exhibit symptoms consistent
with other models.

II. Admissibility of Rape Trauma Syndrome by the
69
Prosecution
Since the first wave of RTS cases in the early 1980's, jurisdictions
around the nation have struggled to reconcile competing rights and
interests in an effort to construct a principled standard of
admissibility for RTS evidence. 70 In fashioning distinct evidentiary
64. See DSM-IV, supra note 4, at 428; see also Hackman, supra note 10, at 456.
Providing a more simplified description, one commentator has explained that:
Symptoms of RTS are, for simplicity's sake, divided into two categories of
behavior that a woman who has been raped may exhibit: avoidant behavior and
intrusive ideation. Avoidant behavior can be present in a number of ways, but is
best characterized by a woman who, after the rape, avoids any person, situation
or location that reminds her of the rape. Intrusive ideation is the opposite.
These women relive the rape over and over in their minds and can have
flashbacks based on anything that reminds them of the rape, resulting in lack of
concentration and sleep.
Id. (citations omitted).
65. See DSM-IV, supra note 4, at 429.
66. See Clarke, supra note 9, at 259; Frazier & Borgida, supra note 45, § 10-2.2.1, at
418-21.
67. See DSM-IV, supra note 4, at 429.
68. See I FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 3, § 10-1.1, at 403.
69. The selection and arrangement of the following classification of cases are
substantially based upon the thoroughly researched work of Karla Fischer. See Fischer.
supra note 5.
70. See id. at 710-13. Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence, trial courts have
broad discretion to admit RTS evidence insofar as it is relevant and helpful to the factfinder in determining a fact in issue. See FED. R. EvID. 702. Modifying this flexible rule
of admissibility, the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.,Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993), held that when considering a proffer of scientific evidence, judges
must function as gatekeepers who are responsible for screening out unreliable or
methodologically invalid evidence. It is unclear whether and to what extent this new
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boundaries, the judicial treatment of RTS reflects diverse views about

and the Sixth Amendment rights
how social science, rape shield laws,
71
of the accused should be balanced.
Almost all courts prohibit RTS testimony that states or implies
that a victim has actually been raped.72 This type of expert testimony
is characterized as a direct judgment of the victim's credibility, which
is to be determined exclusively by the jury.73 Thus, in a typical case,
the court in State v. McCoy held that in a prosecution where the
defense is consent, expert testimony regarding the existence of
symptoms consistent with RTS is admissible. 74 However, in
distinguishing between the legitimate use of countering a claim of
consent and the impermissible use of bolstering victim credibility, the
court declared that "[w]e... must draw a distinction between an
expert's testimony that an alleged victim exhibits post-rape behavior
consistent with rape trauma syndrome and expert opinion that
bolsters the credibility of the alleged victim by indicating that she was
indeed raped." 75
The exclusion of RTS testimony for these purposes is
traditionally based on the rationale that allowing expert opinion on76
credibility would impermissibly invade the province of the jury.
Consequently, to maintain the integrity of the fact-finding process,
courts will not permit an expert to make a legal conclusion or testify
standard will or should affect admissibility of RTS evidence and other psychiatric expert
testimony. See generally Christopher Slobogin, PsychiatricEvidence in Criminal Trials: To
Junk or Not to Junk?, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1 (1998); Allison Morse, Social Science in
the Courtroom:Expert Testimony and Battered Women, 21 HAMLINE L. REv. 287 (1998);
David L. Faigman & Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of
Science, 39 ARiz. L. REv. 67 (1997); Krista L. Duncan, "Lies, Damned Lies, and
Statistics"? PsychologicalSyndrome Evidence in the CourtroomAfter Daubert,71 IND. L.J.
753 (1996).
71. See 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 3, § 10-1.5, at 413 (recognizing that courts must
engage in the balancing of competing constitutional, social scientific, and evidentiary
values in order to forge principled boundaries of admissibility).
72. See Fischer, supra note 5, at 724-26; see also State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192, 210
(N.M. 1993) ("[PTSD] may not be offered to establish that the alleged victim is telling the
truth; that is for the jury to decide."); State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235, 239 (Mo. 1984) (en
banc) (concluding that "expert opinion testimony is not admissible as it relates to
credibility of witnesses"); State v. Martens, 629 N.E.2d 462, 467-68 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993)
(declaring that RTS testimony was admissible to explain the victim's post-rape reactions
but not admissible to prove that a rape occurred) (citing People v. Taylor, 552 N.E.2d 131,
138-39 (N.Y. 1990)).
73. See State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227,230-31 (Minn. 1982).
74. 366 S.E.2d 731,736-37 (W. Va. 1988).
75. Id. at 737; see also State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235, 240 (Mo. 1984) (en bane)
(holding that "[such a] conclusion vouches too much for the victim's credibility and
supplies verisimilitude for her on the critical issue of whether defendant did rape her").
76. See Saldana,324 N.W.2d at 230; see also Fischer, supranote 5, at 725.
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regarding an ultimate issue of fact in the trial, namely, that the victim
77
was raped.
A.

Social Frameworks

While there is significant agreement among courts concerning
prohibiteduses of RTS testimony, there is considerable disagreement
regarding permitted uses of RTS testimony. 78 As described in detail
below, RTS and PTSD testimony is ordinarily proffered by the
prosecution in cases where the defense to a rape charge is consent.
Most courts have determined that general expert testimony offered
by the prosecution to explain unusual aspects of a victim's post-rape
behavior is admissible. 79 In addition, virtually all courts permit expert
testimony to rebut an express or implied assertion by the accused that
the victim's post-rape behavior is not typical for a woman who has
been raped. 80 Some ostensibly peculiar responses may include the
victim's interactions with police, unexpected delay in reporting the
rape, or inconsistent statements made to the police regarding the
rape. 81 Other counterintuitive behavioral responses characteristically
exhibited by survivors of rape include emotional detachment
immediately following the rape, memory loss, and the unequivocal
denial that a rape has occurred. 82
Because much of a victim's post-rape behavior may appear
inconsistent with a lay juror's notion of appropriate post-rape
behavior, a juror may improperly conclude that no rape has
occurred. 83 As a result, expert testimony is generally admissible to
77. See Fischer, supra note 5, at 725. However, a majority of states have adopted the
Federal Rules of Evidence which provide that a testifying expert may give an opinion that
embraces the ultimate issue-that is, whether or not the complainant was raped. See FED.
R. EVID. 702.
78. See 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 3, § 10-1.2, at 404.
79. See Fischer, supra note 5, at 713-14.
80. See 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 406 & n.20; see also People v. Hampton,
746 P.2d 947, 953-54 (Colo. 1987) (Lohr, J., concurring) (en banc) (admitting RTS
testimony for the limited purpose of explaining the victim's delay in reporting); State v.
Moran, 728 P.2d 248, 253-56 (Ariz. 1986) (permitting admission of expert testimony
explaining that the presence of certain typical behavioral responses including delayed
reporting and recantation was not inconsistent with sexual abuse).
81. See Clarke, supra note 9, at 274-78.
82. See Fischer, supra note 5, at 714.
83. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 431 N.W.2d 165, 172-73 (Wis. 1988) (refusing to allow
the accused to capitalize on commonly held misconceptions regarding appropriate postassault behavior); Hampton, 746 P.2d at 952 (recognizing that "[t]he lay notion of what
behavior logically follows the experience of being raped may not be consistent with the
actual behavior which social scientists have observed from studying rape victims"): People
v. Bledsoe, 681 P.2d 291, 298 (Cal. 1984) (en banc) (observing that RTS evidence serves a
particularly vital function "by disabusing the jury of some widely held misconceptions
about rape and rape victims, so that it may evaluate the evidence free of the constraints of
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negate misconceptions about rape and counteract juror bias in favor
of the accused. 84 By providing background information regarding the
wide range of appropriate post-rape reactions women experience, the

expert creates a social framework within which the jury can more
fairly and accurately evaluate witness credibility.8 5 In this way, the
expert can explain counterintuitive behavior and provide a deeper
and more insightful understanding into the social context in which
certain phenomena occur.
Finally, some courts allow the prosecution to admit expert
testimony describing the general characteristics of RTS.8 6 Under this

approach, courts distinguish between general descriptive testimony
and testimony based on a psychological diagnosis. 87 Here, the expert
may not assert that the victim actually suffers from RTS or raperelated PTSD. Rather, she is limited to explaining the general theory

underlying RTS, and the various behavioral responses associated with
popular myths").
84. See Fischer, supra note 5, at 714; but see 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 3, § 10-1.5,
at 412 (observing that there is little empirical evidence to support the contention that
jurors hold stereotypical and inaccurate views of a woman's reactions to sexual assault).
85. See generally Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks:A New Use of
Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987). Walker and Monahan coined the term
"social frameworks" to describe a particular use of social science evidence. They explain
that:
[When] empirical information is being offered that incorporates aspects of both
of the traditional uses [legislative and adjudicative fact-finding]: general research
results are used to construct a frame of reference or background context for
deciding factual issues crucial to the resolution of a specific case. We call this
new use of social science in law the creation of socialframeworks.
Id at 559.
86. See People v. Hampton, 746 P.2d 947, 951-52 (Colo. 1987) (en bane) (admitting
expert testimony describing the complex psychological responses attributable to RTS in
addition to an explanation of counterintuitive post-rape behaviors). In Hampton, a
qualified expert testified that "rape victims' reactions to men usually change, that most
rape victims wish to avoid or escape from the scene of a sexual assault and that a rape
victim is less likely to report a rape when the assailant is someone with whom she is
acquainted rather than a stranger." lIdat 948. In that case, the permissible testimony was
not particular to the victim, though lay testimony regarding the victim's post-rape
reactions demonstrated consistency with RTS and provided the necessary predicate to
support the nexus requirement for relevancy. See id. While the court seemed primarily
concerned with the scope of the testimony, in a concurring opinion Justice Lohr declared
that the court did not decide whether the scope of generalized RTS testimony could
permissibly extend beyond an explanation of seemingly unusual post-rape reactions such
as delayed reporting. See id- at 953 (Lohr, J., concurring).
87. According to Fischer, this approach to admissibility focuses on scope rather than
purpose. See Fischer, supra note 5, at 717-19. Thus, in cases where courts admit general
RTS testimony, they are less concerned with whether it is limited to an explanation of
atypical responses. Rather, the analysis distinguishes between permissible general
testimony and impermissible particularized testimony. That is, the expert may discuss a
class of victims, but must refrain from referring to an individual victim.
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an RTS diagnosis. 88 This type of evidence differs from testimony
describing general post-rape behavior because the expert actually
describes RTS symptoms in a hypothetical victim and is not limited to
the explanation of counterintuitive behavior.89 Furthermore, the
testimony is offered as circumstantial evidence of lack of the victim's
consent, rather than to merely reconcile behavioral inconsistencies. 90
The expert need not have examined the victim; therefore, her
testimony merely creates an inference of nonconsensual intercourse,
leaving the jury free to conclude that a rape has occurred. 9'
B.

Consistency Testimony

The most accepted form of RTS testimony is offered to show that
a victim's post-rape behavior is consistent with that of a woman who
suffers from RTS.92 Even courts most critical of RTS permit lay
testimony regarding the extent to which a victim's behavior after the
alleged incident is consistent with a traumatic event. 93 In this context,
expert testimony typically consists of an opinion concerning
characteristic behavior present in a woman with RTS and the extent
to which the victim's symptoms and post-rape behaviors are
consistent or inconsistent with RTS symptomology. 94
Unlike
testimony that is limited to refuting an assertion by the accused that
the victim's behavior is inconsistent with a woman who has been
raped, under the consistency approach the prosecution may introduce
RTS in its case-in-chief. Under this theory of admissibility, the expert
does not actually render a diagnosis that the victim is suffering from
RTS, but rather testifies generally regarding the typical behaviors
associated with RTS and the extent to which the victim's post-rape
behavior is consistent with such a diagnosis. 95 Testimony of this type
is particularly beneficial in cases where there is no physical evidence
that a rape occurred, and is most often utilized by the prosecution to
96
rebut the defendant's claim that the victim consented.

88. See id. at 717-18. As such, the testimony may not be limited to the explanation of
counterintuitive post-rape reactions. Rather, the expert could testify regarding RTS
generally, on the theory that the entire phenomenon of rape is complex and beyond juror
understanding.
89. See id. at 718.
90. See id. at 717.
91. See id.
92. See 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 3, § 10-1.2.2, at 406. Though fewer courts admit
consistency testimony than do those that admit prosecutorial rebuttal testimony to prove
post-rape behavior was not inconsistent with one who has been raped. See id.
93. See id.; see also State v. Black, 745 P.2d 12, 19 (Wash. 1987) (en banc).
94. See 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 3, § 10-1.2.2, at 406.

95. See Fischer, supra note 5, at 720-22.
96. See 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 3, § 10-1.2.2, at 406.
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This approach has been followed in at least four state supreme

courts. 97 In State v. McCoy, the West Virginia Supreme Court
allowed the prosecution's expert to testify that the post-rape
symptoms exhibited by the victim were consistent with those
normally attributable to RTS. 98 There, the court reasoned that this

type of testimony was distinguishable from expert testimony which
impermissibly bolsters the credibility of the victim because it does not
assert that a rape has occurred. 99 Rather, the expert properly leaves

this inference to be drawn by the fact-finder after describing the
presence of symptoms consistent with RTS or PTSD. 1°°
Similarly in State v. Taylor, the Missouri Supreme Court upheld
the admissibility of expert testimony asserting that the victim
exhibited characteristics consistent with those resulting from a
traumatic stress reaction such as forcible rape. 10 1 However, the court
refused to admit testimony that the victim was actually diagnosed

with RTS because such testimony was considered to be highly
prejudicial.1°2 The court distinguished diagnostic testimony based on
97. See State v. Jensen, 432 N.W.2d 913, 918-20 (Wis. 1988); State v. McCoy, 366
S.E.2d 731 (W. Va. 1988); Simmons v. State, 504 N.E.2d 575 (Ind. 1987); State v. Taylor,
663 S.W.2d 235 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
98. 366 S.E.2d at 733 (permitting qualified expert to testify about common behavior of
rape victims and give her opinion regarding whether the complainant's post-incident
reactions conformed to typical post-rape behavior).
99. See id. at 737 (conceding that RTS is relevant and admissible in a prosecution for
rape where the defense is consent and declaring, "[t]he expert may testify that the alleged
victim exhibits behavior consistent with rape trauma syndrome, but the expert may not
give an opinion, expressly or implicitly, as to whether or not the alleged victim was
raped"); see also State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192, 210 (N.M. 1993). Grounding its
reasoning in the scientific validity of PTSD research, the New Mexico Supreme Court in
Alberico declared that:
Allowing an expert to testify that PTSD symptoms are a common reaction to
sexual assault for the purpose of rebutting the defense that the victim's reactions
to the alleged incident are inconsistent with sexual assault is no different from
allowing the expert to testify that the alleged victim's symptoms are consistent
with sexual abuse. Although... some... courts maintain a bright-line
distinction between these two purposes... we see no logical difference. Both of
these purposes for which PTSD evidence is offered rest on the valid scientific
premise that victims of sexual abuse exhibit identifiable symptoms. Either the
PTSD diagnosis is a valid scientific technique for identifying certain symptoms of
sexual abuse or it is not.
100. See McCoy, 366 S.E.2d at 737.
101. 663 S.W.2d at 240 ("Properly qualified, an expert in the psychological testing field
may testify that the patient, client or victim does possess and exhibit the characteristics
consistent with those resulting from a traumatic stress reaction, such as rape.").
102. See id. In Taylor, the court acknowledged that the existence of psychological
symptoms in a victim, which correspond to a traumatic stress reaction, is probative on the
issue of force. Id. However, the court feared that particularized diagnostic testimony
stating that the victim suffers from RTS suggests that the syndrome may only be caused by
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a victim examination from general consistency testimony because the
jury is more likely to regard the former as dispositive on the issue of
consent. According to the court in Taylor, by cloaking the testimony
in a particularized diagnosis, the jury would be misled by an "aura of
certainty" that surrounds scientific evidence.1 03 Therefore, the Taylor
court limited the admissibility of victim-specific testimony to an
explanation of whether the victim's behavior is consistent with RTS
and refused to permit the expert to render an actual diagnosis. 1°4
C. Diagnostic Testimony
Declining to follow the reasoning set forth in Taylor, a minority
of state courts will admit expert testimony that the victim has actually
been diagnosed with RTS or rape-related PTSD to refute the defense
of consent. 0 5 This type of testimony is very different from the above
described consistency approach because it creates a much stronger
inference that the victim has been raped and can be construed by the
jury to be an expert validation of the victim's individual credibility. 106
Nevertheless, some courts hold that testimony that the victim suffers
from RTS or PTSD does not imply that the expert believes that the
victim was raped. 107 When the state seeks to introduce this type of
testimony, the expert describes the actual victim's symptoms but
refrains from giving any opinion regarding the traumatic source of
those symptoms. 0 8 In order to admit testimony of this type, the
state's expert must have examined the victim before trial or treated
the victim subsequent to the assault. 109
For example, in State v. McQuillen, the Supreme Court of
rape. See id. According to the court, since the term RTS itself connotes rape, "[it] should
not be utilized as the instrument to establish the guilt or innocence of one accused of
rape." Id. at 241.
103. Id.
104. Id.; see also State v. Jensen, 432 N.W.2d 913, 920-21 (Wis. 1988) (allowing expert
testimony to describe the victim's behavior and the behavior of victims of the same type of
crime); Simmons v. State, 504 N.E.2d 575, 579 (Ind. 1987) (permitting expert testimony
tending to show that the victim's post-rape behavior was consistent with the clinically
observed behavior pattern known as "rape trauma syndrome"); State v. McQuillen, 689
P.2d. 822, 829 (Kan. 1984) (allowing expert to testify that the victim does possess and
exhibit the emotional and psychological responses consistent with rape trauma syndrome).
But see State v. McGee, 324 N.W.2d 232 (Minn. 1982) (following its reasoning set forth in
State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 1982), the Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed
a rape conviction where expert was permitted to testify that the victim suffered from
symptoms consistent with rape trauma syndrome).
105. See Fischer, supra note 5, at 722-24.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 722-23.
109. See id. at 720.
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Kansas, in reaffirming its holding in State v. Marks,"0 held that while
an expert must refrain from offering a statement that the victim was
raped, he may nevertheless testify that she has been diagnosed with
rape trauma syndrome."' According to the court, the existence of
RTS is relevant and admissible, so long as the prosecution's expert
refrains from expressing an opinion that the underlying
source of
2
trauma leading to the syndrome was in fact rape."
More recently, in rejecting the assumptions that jurors would be
awed by an "aura of infallibility," the Supreme Court of New Mexico
in State v. Alberico accepted that victims of sexual abuse may exhibit
identifiable symptoms and declared that a "PTSD diagnosis is no
different from any other method or technique" that is grounded in
basic behaviorial psychology." 3 Though it acknowledged the selfreferential and inconclusive aspects of a PTSD diagnosis, the court
nevertheless concluded that a qualified expert may testify that the
alleged victim114 exhibits symptoms of PTSD consistent with rape or
sexual abuse.
As discussed at length in Part IV, diagnostic expert testimony
must be admitted with extreme care because a treating clinician is
generally focused on psychological therapy and recovery, rather than
victim credibility. 115 That is, she is primarily concerned with treating
the victim's symptoms to facilitate recovery rather than probing for
inconsistencies in search of the truth." 6 As a result, a treating
clinician may have natural professional biases that run counter to the
objective fact-finding function of the legal system." 7 Primarily for
this reason, many courts have limited this kind of testimony in favor
of a generalized description of a hypothetical RTS victim without
reference to a particular complainant.
Perhaps the least reliable and most prejudicial testimony
proffered by the state is presented when an expert testifies that the8
victim's RTS diagnosis was in fact precipitated by a rape."

Nevertheless, the court in State v. Allewalt 19 has allowed the

prosecution's
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

expert to testify not only about the victim's

647 P.2d 1292 (Kan. 1982).
State v. McQuillen, 689 P.2d. 822,830 (Kan. 1984).
See L at 829.
861 P.2d 192,209 (N.M. 1993).
See id. at 210.
See Fischer, supra note 5, at 720.

116. See icL
117. See idL
118. See State v. McQuiilen, 689 P.2d. 822, 828-29 (Kan. 1984) (distinguishing
inadmissible testimony which identifies rape as the underlying source of trauma as an
impermissible comment on victim credibility).
119. 517 A.2d 741 (Md. 1986).
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particularized PTSD diagnosis, but also permitted the expert to assert
20
that forcible rape was the traumatic event underlying the diagnosis.
In Allewalt, Maryland's highest court allowed this testimony on the
theory that PTSD was like medical testimony which could permissibly
include medical conclusions and information received from patients
that provide a basis for these conclusions. 121
In rejecting the
defendant's argument that PTSD evidence is not accepted in the
relevant scientific community as a reliable means of identifying the
underlying trauma, 122 the court noted that the expert refrained from
using the terminology "rape trauma syndrome," which reduced the
concern for unfair prejudice and the likelihood that the syndrome
would be exclusively equated with rape. 123
While the court
acknowledged that PTSD could result from a number of stressful
situations, it nevertheless sanctioned the admissibility of testimony
that rape caused the victim's PTSD. 124 Consequently, if an expert is
qualified, that is if she possesses the requisite knowledge and
experience and is able to diagnose the characteristic symptoms of a
disorder, she may also testify regarding the underlying cause of that
125
disorder.
Similarly, the court in State v. Alberico recognized that "there are
no certainties in science" and refused to admit expert testimony that
26
the victim's PTSD symptoms were in fact caused by sexual abuse.
However, the court concluded that since different stressors manifest

120. Id. at 744.
121. Id. at 748-51; cf State v. Moran, 728 P.2d 248, 254-55 & nn.6-8 (Ariz. 1986)
(distinguishing expert opinion based on psychological evaluation from medical testimony
rooted in objectively verifiable physical facts).
122. See Allewalt, 517 A.2d at 748. According to the court:
That argument is like saying a medical diagnosis of a broken bone is not accepted
in the relevant scientific community as a reliable means of identifying the
underlying trauma (or disease) which caused the break. The appropriate inquiry
in the present case is whether there is some policy applicable to evidence offered
in rebuttal of consent in a rape case which prevents a qualified psychiatric
witness from expressing an opinion, based on the patient's history, as to the cause
of a recognized disorder, PTSD, from which, in the expert's opinion, the patient
suffers.
Id.
123. Id. at 751.
124. See id. at 747-48.
125. See generally id. at 747-51. Significantly, the expert was careful to point out under
cross-examination that severe trauma other than rape can lead to a diagnosis of PTSD and
thus avoided expressing an opinion on the victim's credibility. See id. at 744. Other courts
have declined to adopt this reasoning and have excluded diagnostic testimony on the
theory that to do so would create an impermissibly prejudicial inference that the victim
was in fact raped. See State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235, 241 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
126. 861 P.2d 192, 212 (N.M. 1993) (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.. 509
U.S. 579, 590 (1993)).
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themselves in different symptoms, psychologists could isolate the
precise cause of a victim's PTSD. 127 Thus, according to the court in
Alberico, a qualified mental health professional may testify that the
alleged victim suffers from PTSD and that her symptoms are
consistent with those suffered by someone who has been raped.128
Diagnostic testimony strains evidentiary boundaries of
admissibility and is tolerated by only a very small minority of courts.
A proffer of testimony that rape is the underlying source of trauma in
an RTS diagnosis is essentially indistinguishable from an opinion that
the victim was in fact raped. Such an assertion not only constitutes an
impermissible judgment on victim credibility, but also creates a highly
129
prejudicial aura of certainty that the accused committed rape.
Consequently, in admitting this type of testimony, the courts in
Allewalt and Alberico may be sanctioning lower courts' invasion of
the province of the trier of fact. Moreover, as will be argued in detail
in Part IV, many social scientists agree that it is virtually impossible to
conclusively determine that rape, rather than some other traumatic
event, precipitated the onset of PTSD symptoms. As such, this
narrow range of expert testimony is arguably scientifically invalid,
and its admissibility should be severely restricted, if not banned.
To summarize, courts that permit expert testimony of the
victim's RTS or PTSD diagnosis reason that such evidence is helpful
to the fact-finder in deciding the issue of consent because knowledge
of typical post-rape behavior is beyond the ken of the jury.130 These
courts have determined that the social science supporting RTS
diagnoses is sufficiently valid to justify admissibility and is not unduly
prejudicial to the accused. 131 So long as the expert refrains from
opining either explicitly or implicitly that an RTS diagnosis
conclusively proves that the victim was raped, RTS testimony falls
within permissible evidentiary boundaries. 32
M. Rape Trauma Syndrome Testimony Proffered by the
Accused
Though predominantly employed against the accused, the

127. See id. at 209.
128. See idL at 213-14.
129. Notably, however, the court in Allewalt contended that the propensity for unfair
prejudice would be eradicated by liberal cross-examination and proper jury instructions.
Allewalt, 517 A.2d at 751. With these tools, "the trial court can prevent any impression
that the psychiatric opinion is like a chemical reaction." Id.
130. See id. at 748.
131. See Fischer, supra note 5, at 724.
132. See iL
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probative value of RTS is theoretically available to any party.1 33 In
light of the pervasive prosecutorial use of RTS evidence to bolster
conviction rates in cases where the defense is consent, it comes as no
surprise that defendants have begun to demand the right to present
RTS evidence as well. RTS testimony becomes relevant for the
prosecution when the victim's post-rape behavior is consistent with
that of other rape victims suffering from RTS, or when the victim is
actually diagnosed with RTS or PTSD. It follows then that this type
of evidence becomes logically relevant for the accused when the
alleged victim is asymptomatic or her behavior is inconsistent with the
post-rape behavior typical of other victims of rape who suffer from
RTS or rape-related PTSD. 134 Moreover, as discussed in Part IV, this
type of testimony becomes increasingly relevant for the accused when
there is a possibility that the victim's PTSD diagnosis is attributable
to a traumatic event that occurred before the alleged rape.135
Consequently, the defendant may attempt to compel an adverse
psychological examination in order to prove that the RTS diagnosis is
not necessarily attributable to the rape for which he is accused.
Rather, the accused will contend that the victim's symptoms may be a
manifestation of a behavioral stress response attributable to an earlier
traumatic event such as a prior rape, sexual assault, or other
nonsexual trauma. 136 Such unbridled use of RTS by the accused
substantially undermines legitimate interests of the victim and the
state social policy embodied in protective rape shield laws.
Applying traditional rules of admissibility, when the prosecution
opens the door by initially introducing RTS testimony, the defendant
will almost certainly be permitted the use of such evidence. 137 Indeed,
invoking principles of adversarial fairness, core constitutional values,
and general rules of evidence, some courts have sanctioned the use
138
RTS evidence proffered by the accused to rebut the same.
Arguably, in the absence of an initial prosecutorial proffer of RTS
testimony, the privacy interests of the victim substantially outweigh
the defendant's need to rebut, rendering such testimony insufficiently
133. See 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 3, § 10-1.5, at 412.
134. See id. at 412-13.
135. See Stefan, supra note 11, at 1324-27.
136. See id.; see also Clarke, supra note 9, at 259. According to Clarke:
Recent studies suggest that the impact of rape may be so profound because the
rape actually causes physical changes in the woman, not just psychological or
emotional ones. Rape (and other stressors that cause PTSDs) may change the
brain's chemistry.... Because of these changes, a victim of rape may never again
be the same biologically.
Id.
137. See 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 3, § 10-1.5, at 413.
138. See, e.g., State v. Wheeler, 602 N.E.2d 826, 833 (Ill. 1992).
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relevant to justify its admission. However, at least one state supreme
court has rejected this distinction, opting instead to confer upon the
accused unrestricted power to employ RTS evidence, even when the

prosecution has declined to do so first. 39 The following analysis

explores state decisional law confronting defense-sponsored RTS
evidence and describes judicial justifications in favor of admissibility.
A. State v. McQuillen

In State v. McQuillen, the Kansas Supreme Court reaffirmed its
earlier holding in State v. Marks'4° that "[w]hen consent is the defense
in a prosecution for rape, qualified expert psychiatric testimony
regarding the existence of 'rape trauma syndrome' is relevant and
admissible.' 41 Accordingly, the state's expert may testify that the
victim suffers from RTS or that she exhibits emotional and
psychological responses consistent with an RTS diagnosis. 42
Distinguishing RTS evidence offered by the accused, the court
recognized that in order for the defendant to proffer "negative
evidence" of RTS, such evidence must have sufficient probative
value. 143 The court further determined that where the prosecution
has not first introduced testimony of the existence of RTS, evidence
of its nonexistence has no probative value and is inadmissible. 144
However, where the prosecution first raises the issue and opens the
door by a proffer of RTS, syndrome evidence becomes sufficiently
probative such that the accused can assert the absence of RTS in
support of his defense of consent.
Though beyond the scope of the express holding, the logical
extension of the court's reasoning dictates that if the state elects to
introduce RTS evidence based on a particularized diagnosis obtained
from a psychiatric examination, the defendant must be permitted to
compel the victim to submit to an adverse examination by his own
expert. In order to proffer this type of diagnostic testimony, the
state's expert generally must examine the victim before trial. The
McQuillen court conceded that the defendant must be permitted to
139.
140.
141.
142.

See Henson v. State, 535 N.E.2d 1189,1194 (Ind.1989).
647 P.2d 1292 (Kan. 1982).
State v. McQuillen, 689 P.2d. 822,829 (Kan. 1984).
See iL at 827-30.

143. Idat 830.
144. See id According to the court:
There are no statistics to show that there is any value to a negative finding that
the rape trauma syndrome is not exhibited by the alleged victim. Negative
evidence to be admissible must have some probative value. Where consent is the
defense in a prosecution for rape, expert testimony of the absence of the rape
trauma syndrome is not relevant or admissible.
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cross-examine the state's expert in order to challenge his diagnostic
methods and conclusions, and to have his own expert testify that the
woman does not suffer from RTS. 45 Implicit in the court's reasoning
is the recognition that when the prosecution elects to introduce
diagnostic testimony based on victim examination, the defendant
could successfully claim a right to have his own expert examine the
victim in order to refute the state's diagnosis.1 46 Indeed, the court in
McQuillen recognized that once the state introduced evidence that
the victim was suffering from a stress similar to RTS, the defendant
had to be given the opportunity to establish that she was not suffering
from such stress. 147 In finding that the trial court incorrectly
concluded that the admission of defense-sponsored RTS testimony
would violate rape shield laws, the court further observed that the
Kansas rape shield statute was not an absolute prohibition against the
defendant presenting evidence of the complaining witness's prior
sexual conduct. 148 Nor did the statute prohibit the prosecuting
attorney from introducing evidence of the victim's prior sexual
149
conduct.
B. State v. Allewalt
In State v. Allewalt, Maryland's highest court permitted the
prosecution's expert witness to testify that forcible rape was the
150
traumatic event that precipitated the victim's PTSD diagnosis.
Based upon a standard psychiatric examination and the victim's
145. Id.
146. See id. In McQuillen, the court concluded that the accused must be permitted to
admit evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct to the extent the state relies on the
same in its case-in-chief. Id. On this reasoning, the accused could conduct searching
cross-examinations of the victim and state's expert as a ploy to parade before the jury
explicit details of the victim's past sexual history. See id. at 835 (Schreoder, J., dissenting).
Alternatively, in recognizing the right of the accused to examine the victim where the state
has done so first, the court implicitly condoned compelled adverse psychiatric
examinations to challenge the state's proffer of RTS evidence. See id. at 827.
147. Id. ("[T]o ensure a fair trial for the defendant, the defendant's expert had to
complete his evaluation in order to determine if the victim was or was not suffering the
rape trauma syndrome.").
148. See id. at 830 (reasoning that defense-sponsored use of RTS is limited by principles
of relevance, the court nevertheless conceded that the accused may bring his own expert
witness to rebut the presence of RTS and implied that a searching inquiry into the victim's
sexual past may be justified where the state renders it relevant through its initial
diagnosis).
149. See id. Anticipating the consequences that flow from prosecutorial use of RTS
evidence, Justice Herd cautioned that "[t]he argument that admitting evidence of rape
trauma syndrome would nullify the rape shield statute ... is certainly a possibility which
the prosecutor would need to take into consideration in planning his trial tactics in
cooperation with the victim." Id. at 831 (Herd, J., concurring).
150. 517 A.2d 741, 744 (Md. 1986).
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personal history, the state's expert testified that he believed the
151
victim suffered from the recognized mental disorder PTSD.
Acknowledging that "almost any trauma" could cause PTSD, even
those that were not life threatening, the expert nevertheless opined
152
that forcible rape was the underlying cause of the victim's PTSD.
Thus, despite convincing evidence that the specific trauma underlying
a PTSD diagnosis cannot be conclusively determined, 53 the court
ruled that there exists no policy applicable to evidence offered in
rebuttal to a defense of consent which prevents a qualified psychiatric
witness from expressing an opinion as to a PTSD diagnosis of the
154
victim as well as the underlying cause of such a recognized disorder.
Although the decision of this case was based on the prosecutorial
use of rape-related PTSD, Allewalt is significant for the potential
defense use of PTSD as well. In fact, the court noted in its opinion
that a trial court's decision to admit diagnostic PTSD testimony
necessarily carries with it far reaching consequences. 55 Specifically,
the court acknowledged that its reasoning could not only lead to
cross-examination of the expert about PTSD generally, but also
probing questioning directed at the victim about possible causes of
56
the disorder other than the assault charged in the criminal case.
Recognizing the scope of its decision, the court declared that, "we can
foresee cases where the defendant will seek to counter the State's
PTSD evidence with its own expert testimony... [including]
compulsory psychiatric examination of the complainant by an expert
for the defense."' 157

151. See id
152- Id Under cross-examination the expert stated that he knew of at least one case
where a patient's unjustified arrest for shoplifting had precipitated PTSD, and that while a
slow marital breakup is not sufficiently stressful and sudden to give rise to a PTSD
diagnosis, any direct sudden shock such as finding one's spouse in bed with another or
coming home and finding the furniture gone is sufficiently traumatic to produce the
disorder. See id However, the expert did concede that his opinion was based on the fact
that rape was the only significant trauma the victim reported to him. See id.
153. According to the court, since the expert refrained from using the term "rape
trauma syndrome" and recognized that alternative trauma other than rape can lead to the
development of PTSD, the testimony was not overly prejudicial to the accused. See id at
751.
154. See id at 748-51.
155. See id at 751.
156. See id. Indeed, the court recognized that its ruling "necessarily carries certain
baggage with it," and observed that "[liurking in the background is the nice question of
whether the absence of PTSD is provable by the accused in defense of a rape charge, as
tending to prove that there was consent." Id
157. Id
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C. State v. Wheeler
What was implicit in Allewalt and McQuillen became the express
holding of the court in State v. Wheeler. In Wheeler, the Supreme
Court of Illinois considered whether a defendant in a rape trial should
have been permitted to compel an examination of the victim in an
effort to establish the absence of RTS. 58 The prosecution's expert, a
psychotherapist, had determined based on a single interview that the
victim had symptoms consistent with RTS. 159 The defendant
contended that under the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, he was constitutionally guaranteed the opportunity to
have his own expert examine the victim to determine whether she
suffered from RTS. 160 The court began by noting that in order to
ensure a fundamentally fair trial, the Constitution requires that the
accused be able to present witnesses in his own defense. 61 While the
defendant was not precluded from presenting his own witnesses, his
162
expert was precluded from personally examining the victim.
However, arguably, without the opportunity to examine the victim,
the basis upon which the defense expert could form a rebuttal opinion
was substantially circumscribed. Thus, the central issue before the
court was whether the Due Process Clause of the Constitution
requires that the defendant be permitted to compel an adverse
examination to adequately defend against a criminal charge of rape
when the prosecution bases its claim of nonconsent on an
examination of the victim, and consequently, whether the denial of
that right deprives the accused of a fundamentally fair trial.
The state protested that the defendant's rights are adequately
honored when his expert is restricted to forming an opinion about the
victim's condition based only on the observation of trial testimony
and the analysis of written reports. 163 However, the supreme court
disagreed, stressing the inherent qualitative differences between

158. State v. Wheeler, 602 N.E.2d 826, 830 (Ill. 1992). Prior to trial, defendant learned

that the state intended to introduce expert testimony diagnosing the victim as suffering
from RTS. See id. at 828. To refute the state's proffer of RTS evidence, the accused
sought a motion to compel his alleged victim to submit to an examination by his own

expert. See id.
159. See id. at 829.
160. See id. at 830.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 832. On this reasoning, because the defendant was not completely
prevented from offering evidence that the victim did not suffer from RTS, application of

the state law precluding a defense-compelled examination did not deprive him of a fair
trial. See id.
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testimony from an examining and nonexamining expert.

64

According

to the court, "[w]hile it may be possible for an expert to form an
opinion regarding rape trauma syndrome based only on a review of
reports and trial testimony, this is clearly not the preferred

method.' 1 65 Indeed, the value of a personal examination is greatly
enhanced to the extent the examining expert bases a diagnosis on

observations of nonverbal factors and subjective interpretations of
patient responses. 166 Consequently, "[a]n expert who has personally
examined a victim is in a better position to render an opinion than is
an expert who has not done so."167 Furthermore, it is extremely
difficult to effectively rebut a prosecutorial RTS diagnosis with
generalized consistency testimony alone. Consequently, the court
posited that notwithstanding the intended protection of the state's

rape shield law, the prosecution's election to use RTS testimony as
substantive evidence to prove that a rape occurred constituted a

powerful reason to permit the accused to compel the victim to submit
to a psychiatric examination. 168 The court recognized that past
defendants have intentionally used examinations to harass and
intimidate victims of rape, but contended nevertheless, that "we must
balance the victim's rights to be free from intrusion with the
defendant's constitutional rights to a fair trial."'169 By subjecting the
victim to a compelled psychiatric examination, the accused does not
necessarily violate the privacy interests protected by the state rape
shield law.

70

Rather, according to the court, the accused was merely

164. See id.
165. Id.
166. See iL
167. Id. (citing Fischer, supra note 5,at 733 n.320).
168. See id.at 833. In recognizing the need to protect the privacy of sexual assault
victims, the court nevertheless concluded that:
Because the State in this case had the exclusive right to examine [the victim], the
credibility of its expert was elevated above that of any nonexamining expert
defendant could call. Thus, we find it is fundamentally unfair that the State was
able to present the testimony of an examining expert but the defendant was
limited to the testimony of a nonexamining expert.
Id.
169. Id. "'[A] State may not legitimately assert an interest in maintenance of a strategic
advantage over the defense, if the result of that advantage is to cast a pall on the accuracy
of the verdict obtained."' Id. (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68,79 (1985)).
170. See id. at 831-32. The state rape shield law provides, in pertinent part, that "no
court may require or order a witness who is the victim of an alleged sex offense to submit
to or undergo either a psychiatric or psychological examination." I&. at 830. The court
observed that the state rape shield legislation was intended to eliminate the defense
practice of intimidating sex offense victims through, psychological examinations focusing
on their competence and credibility as a witness. See id However, the defendant was not
seeking to undermine victim credibility or competence; rather, he was merely attempting
to refute RTS testimony proffered by the state as evidence that a sexual assault occurred.
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attempting to preserve his constitutional right to a fair trial by
countering the state's RTS evidence through his own psychological
17
examination. '
Ultimately, the court issued its ambitious departure and declared
that "unless the victim consents to an examination by an expert
chosen by the defendant, the State may not introduce testimony from
an examining expert that the victim of an alleged sexual assault
suffers from a 'recognized and accepted form of post-traumatic stress
syndrome.""' 172 Consequently, where the victim in a rape prosecution
refuses to submit to an adverse examination, the state may not
introduce evidence of RTS through an examining expert. Where,
however, the victim agrees to submit to an examination by an expert
chosen by the accused, the state may introduce diagnostic RTS
testimony to prove nonconsent. At base, the court held that
whenever the prosecution introduces RTS evidence through
testimony of an examining expert, the defense must be permitted to
compel an examination of the victim as well. 73 If the victim refuses
to submit to an examination, both the defendant and the state will be
restricted to the use of generalized testimony submitted by
174
nonexamining experts.
D. Henson v. State
Expanding the evidentiary boundaries of defense-sponsored RTS
evidence, the court in Henson v. State sanctioned the unrestricted
power of the accused to initiate the use of RTS evidence to prove a
See id. at 831. Thus, according to the court, where the accused seeks to rebut substantive
evidence proffered by state, the protective policies underlying rape shield legislation are
not violated.
171. See id. at 831-32. The court ultimately conceded that because the accused was
denied the opportunity to counter the state's evidence with evidence of a substantially
equal quality, he was deprived a fair trial. See id. at 833-34. Describing the fundamental
aspects of our adversary system the court recognized that:
"'The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were to be founded
on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The very integrity of the
judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of
all the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence. To ensure that
justice is done, it is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory process
be available for the production of evidence needed either by the prosecution or
by the defense."'
Id. at 832 (quoting United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230-31 (1975) (quoting United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974))).
172. Id. at 833 (citation omitted).
173. See id.
174. The court emphasized that the victim may exercise her right to refuse a defensecompelled examination, which would foreclose the state's ability to proffer diagnostic
testimony. See id. Consequently, the victim, in theory, retains control over the scope of
RTS evidence proffered by the state.

July/August 1998]

RAPE TRAUMA SYNDROME

defense of consent. 175 In Henson, the Indiana Supreme Court
considered whether the defendant in a rape trial should be permitted
to use RTS testimony in a case where the prosecution had declined to
introduce it first.176 The court, refusing to distinguish cases where the
state has not first opened the door, concluded that defense-sponsored
RTS testimony is admissible. 177 According to the majority, the court
below erred in excluding defense expert testimony that the victim's
conduct, after the alleged rape, was inconsistent with that of a person
who has suffered a traumatic forcible rape. 78 Emphasizing that its
jurisdiction had already recognized the admissibility of RTS, the court
reasoned that since it had previously crossed the scientific reliability
hurdle, "[i]t would [now] be fundamentally unfair to allow the use of
such testimony by the State... and then deny its use by a defendant
here."' 79 In support of its holding, the court declared that to deny the
defendant the opportunity to present syndrome evidence impinged
upon the substantial rights of the accused to present a complete
defense. 8 0
In Henson, the defendant's expert had never personally
consulted with the complainant and had no first hand knowledge of
the alleged rape.181 Rather, the expert merely testified through
general observation of the victim's behavior (of which there was
evidence from previous testimony) that her post-rape conduct was
inconsistent with that of a hypothetical victim who had suffered a
traumatic rape similar to the one described at trial. 82 The court
based its decision in part on an earlier case upholding the
admissibility of prosecutorial consistency testimony. 183 In Simmons v.
State, the Indiana Supreme Court admitted expert testimony which
concluded that the victim's inability to recall certain events was
consistent with clinically observed patterns of behavior. 184 The court
in Simmons reasoned that such testimony was unobjectionable
was
because it tended to show that the victim had suffered a rape and
85
truth.
the
telling
was
victim
the
whether
of
not a direct opinion
Extending this reasoning to defense-sponsored evidence, the
Henson court recognized that while the expert opinion offered by the
175. 535 N.E.2d 1189 (Ind.1989).
176. Id at 1191.
177. See id. at 1193-94.

178. See idat 1192-94.
179. Id.at 1193.

180.
181.
182.
183.

See id.
at 1194.
Id.
at 1193.
See id
See id

184. 504 N.E.2d 575,578-79 (Ind.1987).

185. Id at 579.

1538
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accused might undermine the victim's credibility by tending to show
that she had not suffered a rape, it did not do so in an impermissibly
direct manner. 186 "All testimony which contradicts one party's
version of a set of events raises questions about that party's
credibility; however, that does not make the testimony
inadmissible." 187 Indeed, had the court concluded otherwise, the
accused "would be hard pressed to ever present any sort of defense in
his own behalf since the core of any defense usually involves a denial
that the alleged criminal conduct occurred. 1' 88 According to the
court, to deny the defendant the right to use RTS as probative that a
rape did not occur when he asserts a defense of consent, would be to
deprive him of his right to present a complete defense as required by
the Constitution. 189
Consequently, while sanctioning defensesponsored RTS testimony implicates closely guarded privacy interests
of rape victims, the court implied that such an intrusion is justified in
light of the defendant's Sixth Amendment guarantees.
IV. Quest for Empirical Truth
As described above, courts rely upon principles of adversarial
fairness, core constitutional values, and rules of evidence to support
the contention that absent countervailing concerns, the accused must
be permitted to employ RTS evidence to rebut the state's use of the
same. Once the prosecution opens the door to RTS evidence, a
woman's sexual past is rendered logically relevant for the accused.
Moreover, as this Part will show, weaknesses inherent in the scientific
research underlying RTS and rape-related PTSD render syndrome
evidence highly relevant in a rape prosecution. 190
Even
commentators in favor of prosecutorial use of RTS testimony
recognize that problems associated with the self-referential aspects of
a PTSD or RTS diagnosis, the inability to sufficiently distinguish rape
induced PTSD from nonrape-related symptoms, and lifetime
prevalence rates plague the research. 191 In light of these empirical
186. 535 N.E.2d at 1192.

187. Id. at 1193.
188. Id.
189. See id. at 1194.
190. See Massaro, supra note 31, at 441 ("[P]roper cross-examination of an expert about
a victim's RTS symptoms can elicit whether other explanations for the trauma symptoms
exist.... For example, the defense could explore whether the victim had been raped or
sexually assaulted before in her life, a sad but significant possibility."); see also Patricia
Frazier & Eugene Borgida, Rape Trauma Syndrome Evidence in Court, 40 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 984, 991-92 (1985) (observing that courtroom use of rape trauma
syndrome may open door to explorations by the accused of the victim's emotional state of
mind in months prior to the rape).
191. See Stefan, supra note 11, at 1324-27 (describing case where the court reasoned
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shortcomings, the probative value of defense-sponsored RTS
evidence begins to outweigh the privacy interests of the victim.
Though a substantial body of research has been conducted, many
scientists acknowledge that the methodology underlying RTS is
imprecise, and the results- inconclusive. 192 First, there exists
considerable disagreement regarding the range of events that can
precipitate the onset of PTSD.193 Implicating several potential
sources of trauma, the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria provide that PTSD
is characterized by the:
development of characteristic symptoms following exposure to an
extreme traumatic stressor involving direct personal experience of
an event that involves actual or threatened death or serious injury,
or other threat to one's physical integrity; or witnessing an event
that involves death, injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of
another person; or learning about unexpected or violent death,
serious harm, or threat of death 194
or injury experienced by a family
member or other close associate.

The victim's initial reaction must include "intense fear, helplessness,
or horror" and result in symptoms lasting more than one month that
include persistent reexperiencing of the traumatic event, persistent
avoidance or numbing in response to stimuli associated with the
traumatic event, and increased hypervigilance. 195 Although these
criteria appear to be definitive, scientists disagree about the precise
196
nature and range of trauma capable of producing a PTSD response.
While the more extreme traumas (war, torture, natural disaster)
easily meet the diagnostic criteria for "'actual or threatened death or
serious injury' ...

science has not yet developed techniques for

judging and classifying other, more ambiguous events."'197
Consequently, sudden shocking events such as a severe automobile
accident, witnessing spousal infidelity, and prior rape or child abuse,
while not extraordinary life events, can arguably lead to the
development of PTSD. 198 Indeed, some scientists contend that even
that once the prosecutor introduced RTS evidence, the accused was entitled to rebut with
rumors of affairs and prior sexual conduct to provide an alternative explanation for the
victim's hysteria and concern about pregnancy); see also Frazier & Borgida, supra note 45,
§ 10-2.2.1, at 421.
192. See Norman Poythress & Christopher Slobogin, The Scientific Status of Reserach
on Insanity and Diminished Capacity, in I MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 45,
§ 6-2.4.2, at 237, 264-65 & n.163.
193. See id.
at 265.
194. DSM-IV, supra note 4, at 424.
195. Poythress & Slobogin, supra note 192, § 6-2.4.1, at 261.
196. See id.§ 6-2.4.2, at 265 & n.163.
197. Id. at 265 (citation omitted).
198. See DSM-IV, supra note 4, at 424; see also State v. Allewalt, 517 A.2d 741, 744
(Md. 1986).
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seemingly benign, less extreme traumatic events such as a victim's
intense subjective fear about working in an asbestos-ridden building
or of the effects of long-term exposure to second-hand smoke can
precipitate PTSD. 199 Thus, nonsexual trauma experienced by a victim
earlier in her life may constitute a sufficiently imminent physical
threat to bring on PTSD.
Similarly, prior rape or sexual trauma may trigger responses
indistinguishable from those attributable to RTS.
It is an
unfortunately common experience that a significant number of rape
victims have been raped in the past.200 Many victims of prior rape
remain symptomatic for years after the initial attack.201 Research
indicates that four to six years after a rape, twenty-six percent of
victims have not recovered from or adjusted to the previous assault. 202
Perhaps more significantly, RTS symptoms may be caused by a
stressful sexual experience other than forcible rape. Symptoms
associated with RTS may be exhibited by a woman who did not
subjectively consent to intercourse, but who perhaps did not resist
because she was afraid or confused or felt she had no choice.20 3 Thus,
a woman who truly believes that she was raped, when in fact she
outwardly consented, may develop RTS.20 4 Moreover, many women
199. Poythress & Slobogin, supra note 192, § 6-2.4.2, at 265.
200. See Ruch and Hennessy, Sexual Assault: Victim and Attack Dimensions, 7
VICTIMOLOGY 94, 103 (1982) (describing the frequency of multiple rapes, the authors
noted that 17% of subjects were victims of earlier sexual assault); see also Patricia Frazier
& Eugene Borgida, Juror Common Understandingand the Admissibility of Rape Trauma
Syndrome in Court, 12 LAW & HUM. BEH. 101, 109 (1988) (discussing that estimates of
the frequency of multiple rape experiences have varied from 17% to over 60% across
studies).
201. See Waddle & Parts, supra note 20, at 403-04.
202. See id. at 403 (citing ANN WOLBERT BURGESS & LYNDA LYTLE HOLMSTROM.
RAPE: CRISIS & RECOVERY 407-48 (1979)).

203. See Stefan, supra note 11, at 1326-27 (observing that at most, RTS evidence shows
that a woman feels she has been sexually violated and asserting that "[e]ven if one accepts
a link between a past traumatizing sexual event and current symptoms of rape trauma
syndrome, it should be absolutely clear that this event is not necessarily what the law calls
rape"). However, that the law refuses to recognize as rape, intercourse without force,
does not diminish the resulting trauma women experience. See id. at 1326. "[T]he law's
definition of rape is far more parsimonious than women's lived experience of rape as
intercourse against their will. No court considering the admissibility of rape trauma
syndrome has recognized the gulf between the nonconsent that makes a woman
experience sex as rape, and the force and resistance that is required for the law to define it
as rape." Id. at 1326-27 (citing Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1171 (1986):
CATHARINE A.

MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 175-77

(1989)).
204. See id. at 1326 (noting that some scientific literature has determined that
attempted rape causes RTS); see also Judith V. Becker et al., The Effects of Sexual Assault
on Rape and Attempted Rape Victims, 7 VICTIMOLOGY 106, 112 (1982) (asserting that
victims of rape and attempted rape may experience similar reactions).
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victimized by a traumatizing attempted rape may be diagnosed with
RTS or rape-related PTSD. Testifying in a 1990 case, Ann Burgess,
who co-authored the first RTS study, recognized that nonconsensual
205
sexual assault short of rape could cause rape trauma syndrome.
Because an RTS response could be attributable to prior rape,
attempted rape, or even nonsexual trauma, a diagnosis206cannot
conclusively prove the absence of consent in a particular case.
Finally, and perhaps most notably, PTSD symptoms can persist
indefinitely throughout the victim's life. One study suggests that from
twelve to seventeen percent of rape survivors continue to present
PTSD responses several years post-rape. 2°7 This means that an RTS
diagnosis does not necessarily indicate that the victim is responding to
a recently experienced traumatic event. Rather, at the time of trial, a
woman may exhibit symptoms of RTS attributable to a rape or
nonsexual trauma that she suffered many years before. When
lifetime prevalence rates are significant, an expert cannot conclusively
determine that the rape with which the accused is charged, rather
than a prior traumatic event, is the source of RTS symptomology.
At base, forcible rape is merely one of a number of traumatic
events that can lead to the development of PTSD or an RTS
response. 208 More significantly, symptoms presented by a rape
survivor diagnosed with PTSD are not sufficiently distinguishable
from those exhibited by a victim of a different trauma. "Although
rape is clearly so traumatic that it usually leads to psychological
injury, specific symptoms of such injury are not connected to sexual
assaults through the diagnosis of PTSD. PTSD thus cannot
distinguish between victims of rape and victims of other traumas." 209
Consequently, testifying experts cannot definitively conclude that
205. See Commonwealth v. Mamay, 553 N.E.2d 945, 951 (Mass. 1990).
206. See Waddle & Parts, supra note 20, at 403-04 (reasoning that because the presence
of RTS could result from a prior rape, rather than the incident with which the accused is
charged, it may not prove the absence of consent in a particular case).
207. See Frazier & Borgida, supra note 45, § 10-2.2.1, at 421.
208. See 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 3, § 10-1.2.1, at 405.

209. Id This, however, does not render the psychological evidence irrelevant. See it
at 406. Evidence that the victim has symptoms consistent with a diagnosis of RTS or
PTSD is clearly relevant as tending to prove that a traumatic event occurred in cases
where the defense is consent. Principles of relevance require only that evidence be
probative, not dispositive. Accordingly, evidence of PTSD should not be discarded simply
because an expert is unable to conclusively identify the precise underlying trauma. It is
sufficient that the expert can testify that a victim displays psychological and somatic
symptoms consistent with one who has suffered some severe trauma. See id. at 406; see
also State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235, 240 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) ("It may not be gainsaid
that the existence of psychological symptoms in a complainant which correspond to a
traumatic stress reaction is probative of the issue of force, in the sense that it renders that
fact more probable than it would have been without the evidence.").
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rape, rather than some other sudden shocking event, precipitated the
development of PTSD.210 Indeed, RTS is a general term used to
describe post-rape victim behavior; it is simply not a test for whether

a rape occurred. So too, PTSD does not presume to be a "scientific
technique" for identifying certain symptoms of sexual abuse.211
Rather, it is a therapeutic model designed to promote the recognition
of, and recovery from, behavioral responses associated with a
212
traumatic experience.
A second related concern involves the inherent reliability of RTS
and its adaptability to the legal fact-finding context. Specifically, the
driving forces behind RTS research methodology-therapy and
recovery-may not provide a suitable basis for the objective
21 3
determination of fact necessary in a criminal prosecution.
Expressing concern with the clinical origins of RTS research, some
courts have refused to admit RTS as evidence of rape. 214 In
distinguishing empirical from legal fact-finding, an insightful court in

People v. Bledsoe recognized the divergent goals of law and science:
210. See 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 3, § 10-1.2.1, at 405. This critique on the law's
use of science is designed merely to flag potential areas of concern. Most researchers
agree that these weaknesses are not sufficiently problematic to render RTS evidence
inadmissible. See id. at 406. Rather, the description of RTS social science as applied to
the legal fact-finding context is intended only to demonstrate that given empirical
shortcomings, defense-sponsored RTS becomes even more relevant than it otherwise
might have been. Thus, the probative value of RTS evidence proffered by the accused is
substantially enhanced, such that the scales of relevance could ultimately tip in favor of
the defendant's constitutional rights and outweigh the victim's privacy interests.
211. Id. § 10-1.3.3, at 412; cf. State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192, 210 (N.M. 1993)
(characterizing a PTSD diagnosis as a valid scientific technique for identifying certain
symptoms of sexual abuse).
212. See State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 229 (Minn. 1982) ("Rape trauma symdrome
[sic] is not the type of scientific test that accurately and reliably determines whether a rape
has occurred."); cf Alberico, 861 P.2d at 208 (asserting that "PTSD is generally accepted
by psychologists and psychiatrists as a valid technique for evaluating patients with mental
disorders").
213. See Faigman, supra note 25, at 826. That is not to say that social science research
findings systematically subjected to the rigors of the scientific method cannot be employed
in the context of legal decision making. Cf Morse, supra note 70 (challenging the
assertion that only objectively verifiable evidence based on quantifiable studies can ever
form the substance of social science expert testimony).
214. See State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 407 (Utah 1989). In Rimmasch, the court
recognized that:
It should not be surprising that those who undertake to treat persons who may
have suffered sexual abuse have no peculiar competence to judge the credibility
of their patients.... Working hypotheses relied upon by therapists may be useful
for treatment purposes; however, that does not mean that they are reliable
enough to be used for forensic purposes.
Id.; see also Saldana,324 N.W.2d at 230 ("Rape trauma syndrome is not a fact-finding tool,
but a therapeutic tool useful in counseling.").
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Unlike fingerprints, blood tests, lie detector tests, voiceprints or the
battered child syndrome, rape trauma syndrome was not devised to
determine the "truth" or "accuracy" of a particularpast event-i.e.,
whether, in fact, a rape in the legal sense occurred-but rather was
developed by professional rape counselors as a therapeutic tool, to
problems experienced by
help identify, predict and treat emotional
215
the counselors' clients or patients.
Furthermore, the court observed that the therapeutic nature of
RTS research does not emphasize credibility, which is an essential
concern in a criminal trial.2 16 Thus, according to the California
Supreme Court in Bledsoe:
[A]s a rule, rape counselors do not probe inconsistencies in their
clients' descriptions of the facts of the incident, nor do they conduct
independent investigations to determine whether other evidence
corroborates or contradicts their clients' renditions. Because their
function is to help their clients deal with the trauma they are
experiencing, the historicalaccuracy of the clients' descriptionsof the
details of the traumatizing events is not vital in their task. To our
knowledge, all of the studies that have been conducted in this field
to date have analyzed data that have been gathered through this
counseling process and, as far as we are aware, none of the studies
has attempted independently to verify the "truth" of the clients'
recollections or 217
to determine the legal implication of the clients'
factual accounts.

The very concerns, however, that are secondary to the
therapist-credibility and the precise underlying source of traumaare essential for the proper functioning of the fact-finder in the legal
decision-making context. Indeed, a diagnosing therapist has no
means of corroborating the patient's historical accounts. Most RTS
diagnoses are predicated upon "direct symptom endorsement" by the
victim and are therefore subject to manipulation. 218 Thus, there is a
215. 681 P.2d 291, 300 (Cal. 1984) (emphasis added).
216. See iL
217. Id (emphasis added); see also Faigman, supra note 25, at 820-21. In asserting that
as consumers of syndrome evidence, courts should demand more accurate information,
Professor Faigman has observed that:
Although much of the syndrome work is borrowed from therapeutic practices,
the standards in the therapeutic and legal contexts are entirely different. When
used in the therapeutic process, syndrome work is not specifically concerned with
legally relevant criteria, such as whether an alleged rape victim consented.... If
judges do not expect and demand better science, the researchers will not provide
it.
Id.
218. Poythress & Slobogin, supra note 192, § 6-2.4.1, at 262. Though the authors make
this observation in the context of PTSD employed by the accused to support a defense of
insanity, concerns about the self-referential aspects of PTSD are equally applicable in the
context of RTS. When a psychologist diagnoses a victim with RTS or rape-related PTSD,
she necessarily relies on the survivor's declaration that she was raped. Information on
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fatal circularity to reasoning from a PTSD diagnosis to a finding that
the traumatic experience in fact occurred because PTSD accepts as
true, for the purposes of diagnosis, that the traumatic experience
219
described by the victim happened as she said it did.

That researchers in the scientific community may be unable to
determine whether a woman diagnosed with RTS exhibits symptoms
attributable to attempted rape or a prior sexual attack rather than the
rape for which the defendant is charged is constitutionally
problematic. Such empirical indeterminacy substantially undermines
the integrity of the truth finding function in the legal context. It is
difficult to justify categorical exclusion of defense-sponsored RTS
when scientists are unable to conclusively determine the specific type
of trauma that led to PTSD in a particular case.
Indeed.
methodological shortcomings inherent in RTS research render the
ability of the accused to defend with RTS essential to a
constitutionally complete defense. Consequently, when the accused is
precluded from rebutting the state's particularized RTS evidence, he
is denied the opportunity to present an essential element of a
constitutional defense. In recognizing the evidentiary infirmities of
RTS, courts must allow the accused to submit the state's proffer to
the "crucible of adversarial testing" so central to our system's
discovery of truth. As the next Part explains, it is only by subjecting
RTS evidence to rigorous rebuttal and cross-examination that we can
preserve the integrity of the fact-finding process, mitigate the
uncertainty inherent in RTS, and strike a constitutional balance
between legitimate state interests and the rights of the accused.
A.

Unintended Consequences of Rape Trauma Syndrome Research

Evidentiary theories of relevance dictate that once the state
proffers RTS evidence, the victim's sexual behavior becomes relevant
to the accused. Similarly, since science cannot conclusively exclude
alternative sources of trauma underlying RTS symptoms, a woman's
past sexual history is relevant to a constitutionally complete defense.
Invoking principles of adversarial fairness, constitutional balance, and
fact-finding integrity, courts will increasingly admit RTS evidence
proffered by the accused. Recognizing the probative value of RTS

symptoms and functioning is obtained almost exclusively through self-reporting or from
questionnaires or personal interviews, rather than through a more objective method. See
Frazier & Borgida, supra note 45, § 10-2.1.2, at 416. If an examining expert observes
PTSD symptoms, and rape is the only account of recent trauma the victim relates, then she
may rely on this self-referential account to determine the underlying trauma without
regard to possible earlier traumatic events which the victim may have suffered.
219. Frazier & Borgida, supra note 45, § 10-2.1.2, at 416; see also Hutton v. Maryland,
663 A.2d 1289, 1300 (Md. 1995).
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evidence, courts have reasoned that when the state introduces RTS to
refute a defense of consent, the accused must be permitted to defend
with the same. 20 At least one state supreme court has gone even
further, concluding that fundamental fairness demands an
history evidence,
opportunity for the accused to introduce sexual
221
even when the state has declined to do so first.
However, a vexing dilemma arises when the accused seeks to use
RTS evidence offensively against his alleged victim. Arguably, liberal
admissibility of defense-sponsored RTS evidence unjustifiably
compromises core values embodied in rape shield legislation. Driven
by feminists and law enforcement advocates, 48 states and the federal
government have enacted rape shield statutes designed to protect
victims against the embarrassment, invasion of privacy, and sexual
222
stereotyping endured by women who publicly prosecute rape.
Employed by defendants as a device to embarrass and humiliate
victims, compelled examinations contributed to a substantial decrease
223
in the reporting and successful prosecution of rape cases.
Fortunately, modern rape shield laws reformed these prejudicial
practices by prohibiting compulsory exams and restricting inquiry into
a woman's past sexual history.224 By protecting victims of rape from
the embarrassment, intimidation, and humiliation inherent in crossexamination and compulsory psychiatric exams, rape shield laws
diminish institutional biases, preserve victim privacy, and facilitate
the fair prosecution of rape trials.
However, the very research social scientists developed to
overcome institutional biases endured by rape victims for decades is
now being used by defendants to prevent those same victims from
obtaining justice. Extending the reasoning of Henson, the accused
could seek to unilaterally compel a psychiatric examination to
establish: (1) the absence of RTS symptoms or appropriate post-rape
behavior; or (2) that the presence of an RTS response is attributable
to a prior sexual trauma, rather than the rape for which the defendant
is accused. 22 5 RTS experts, even those sympathetic to its admissibility
to aid victims, have conceded that if a woman has been raped before,
or had a traumatic sexual event in the past, her prior sexual history
becomes relevant for the accused. 226 It is not surprising then, that in
sanctioning the right of the accused to compel victim examinations,
220. See, e.g., People v. Wheeler, 602 N.E.2d 826,833 (Ill. 1992).
221. See, e.g., Henson v. State, 535 N.E.2d 1189, 1194 (Ind. 1989).
222. See Hazelton, supra note 14, at 35-36 & n.2.
223. See Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A
Proposalforthe Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REv. 763,795-96 (1986).
224. See Waddle & Parts, supra note 20, at 411.
225. See Stefan, supranote 11, at 1324-27.
226. See id.
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the court in Wheeler concluded that unless victims of rape agree to

submit to an examination by an expert of the defendant's choice, the
prosecution must be precluded from admitting particularized RTS
testimony based on the victim's diagnosis. 227 Clearly, the resurrection
of compelled victim examinations foreshadowed by recent decisional
228
law, strikes at the heart of core rape shield values.
In seeking to preserve rape shield protections, some
commentators contend that the accused must be categorically
precluded from relying on RTS to defend against the state's charge of
rape. 229 Arguably, where the prosecution declines to initiate the
introduction of RTS testimony, the victim's sexual behavior and past
are insufficiently relevant to warrant admission. Survivors of rape
tend to exhibit a vast range of behavior; some manifest few symptoms
while others appear controlled and outwardly "asymptomatic."
Accordingly, the absence of "typical" post-rape behavior is only
marginally relevant to the accused. When balanced against legitimate
rape shield objectives, negative RTS evidence is insufficiently
230
relevant to justify admission by the accused.
However, unqualified exclusion of defense-sponsored RTS
evidence fails to comport with constitutional values of the Sixth
Amendment. Due process and the Sixth Amendment provide that
the accused in a criminal trial shall have a fair opportunity to present

227. See People v. Wheeler, 602 N.E.2d 826, 833 (Ill. 1992). This gives the victim a
"choice" of submitting to a psychiatric examination by two probing experts on the one
hand, and limiting the state's case to a generalized description of RTS symptoms and the
less probative consistency testimony on the other. Arguably, such a result compromises
the state's position, particularly in situations where there is little or no physical evidence
and an RTS diagnosis is the strongest evidence of nonconsent available to the state. To
avoid this potential problem, some courts have chosen to restrict the use of RTS to general
consistency testimony without permitting either side to give particularized testimony
based on examination of the victim. This approach has also won support in at least one
state supreme court to have considered the admissibility of expert testimony concerning
battered woman syndrome. See State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 799 (Minn. 1989)
(holding that expert testimony regarding battered woman syndrome will be limited to a
description of the general syndrome and reasoning that a restriction on diagnostic
testimony will remove the need for compelled examinations of the accused). However, in
the context of rape trauma syndrome, the systematic preclusion of the state's ability to
introduce particularized diagnostic testimony can work a severe disadvantage to the
prosecution where there is little or no physical evidence and the defense is consent. To
foreclose this option would doom many cases at the outset. Thus, the prosecution should
at least have the opportunity to present diagnostic testimony, though perhaps it comes at a
high price. See State v. Maday, 507 N.W.2d 365, 372 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
228. See Stefan, supra note 11, at 1271; Hackman, supra note 10, at 453; Economou.
supra note 11, at 1143.
229. See, e.g., Economou, supra note 11.
230. See State v. Jones, 615 N.E.2d 713, 719 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992); State v. McQuillen,
689 P.2d 822, 830 (Kan. 1989); but see Henson v. State, 535 N.E.2d 1189, 1194 (Ind. 1989).
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a complete evidence and to fully defend against the state's
accusations. Absent countervailing concerns, privacy interests of the
victim in a rape trial may be sufficient to substantially outweigh the
Sixth Amendment rights of the accused to present a complete
defense.P 1 Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that legitimate
state social policy can constitutionally justify precluding relevant
evidence of the victim's prior sexual history with the accused. 232
Nevertheless, under some circumstances, such as when the
prosecution introduces RTS evidence to refute a defense of consent,
the scales of relevance begin to tip in favor of the constitutional rights
of the accused. 233 In accordance with evidentiary theories of
relevance, the prosecution can render the victim's past sexual history
logically relevant to the accused by raising the RTS issue. Moreover,
as discussed at length above, the methodology upon which the
scientific conclusions of RTS are based lacks sufficient certainty to be
dispositive. As a result, the victim's sexual past becomes theoretically
and practically relevant for the defense. Consequently, when the state
relies upon RTS evidence, core constitutional values and principles of
adversarial fairness combine to require that the accused be permitted
to present all the essential elements of his defense. In support of this
conclusion, the following Part advances a method of balancing the
legitimate social policy embodied in rape shield legislation with the
constitutional rights of the accused, and proposes an evidentiary
framework of admissibility when the accused seeks to offer RTS as
part of his constitutionally required defense.
V. Constitutionally Balancing the Rights of the Accused
A. Rape Shield Law

Prior to the passage of modern rape shield protections,
misguided conceptions about female sexuality combined with rules of
character evidence to justify admission of a woman's sexual history to
prove a defense of consent.234 Generally, character or "propensity"
evidence is inadmissible; however, a significant exception to the
general rule provides that the accused may proffer a pertinent trait of
his victim's character to show that she acted in conformity with that
trait.25 Common law applications of this exception mirrored longestablished beliefs that a woman who once engaged in sexual
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

See
See
See
See
See

Waddle & Parts, supranote 20, at 411-13.
Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145,151 (1991).
Waddle & Parts, supranote 20, at 413.
Galvin, supra223, at 777.
FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2).
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relations outside the sanctity of marriage possessed the character for
unchastity. 236 And, furthermore, that a sexually unchaste woman was
more likely to have consented to sex with the accused. An oft cited
rhetorical inquiry illustrates this dominant, yet not too distant,
evidentiary paradigm. Distinguishing between a woman "who has
already submitted herself to the lewd embraces of another, and the
coy and modest female severely chaste and instinctively shuddering at
the thought of impurity" an 1838 court inquired "[a]nd will you not
more readily infer assent in the practised Messalina, in loose attire,
than in the reserved and virtuous Lucretia?" 237 On this reasoning, a
man accused of rape was permitted to prove, and the jury could infer,
that based on a woman's past sexual indiscretions, she probably
238
consented to sex with him as well.
Moreover, female accusers of sex crimes were characterized as
incompetent to testify. Evidence law provides that the accused may
proffer evidence bearing on the victim's character for truthfulness. A
minority of common law courts relied upon this rule to conclude that
unchaste character is relevant not only to the issue of consent, but to
credibility as well. 239 Contending that female "promiscuity imports
dishonesty," courts justified admission of a woman's sexual behavior
based on the assumption that "a certain type of feminine character
240
predisposes to imaginary or false charges of this sort."

236. See People v. Hastings, 390 N.E.2d 1273, 1277 (Ill. App. 1979); People v. Collins,
186 N.E.2d 30, 33 (Ill. 1962). The reasoning advanced by the court in People v. Collins
provides an apt example.
Since want of consent on the part of the complainant is of the essence of the
crime of forcible rape.., it is permissible, in order to show the probability of
consent by the prosecutrix, that her general reputation for immorality and
unchastity be shown. The underlying thought here is that it is more probable
that an unchaste woman would assent to such an act than a virtuous woman.
Id.
237. People v. Abbot, 19 Wend. 192, 195 (N.Y. 1838).
238. Indeed, jury instructions regarding unchaste character admonished the finder of
fact accordingly:
Evidence was received for the purpose of showing that the female person named
in the information was a woman of unchaste character. A woman of unchaste
character can be the victim of forcible rape but it may be inferred that a woman
who has previously consented to sexual intercourse would be more likely to
consent again. Such evidence may be considered by you only for such bearing as
it may have on the question of whether or not she gave her consent to the alleged
sexual act and in judging her credibility.
CALJIC No. 10.06 (3d rev. ed 1970).
239. See Galvin, supra note 223, at 787.
240. 1 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 63, at 467 (3d ed. 1940), see also Virgin
Islands v. John, 447 F.2d 69, 73 (3d Cir. 1971) (declaring that where the issue of consent is
presented, evidence of the woman's reputation for chastity is of substantial probative
value).
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Significantly, the purported link between promiscuity and veracity
was not adopted with respect to men, nor was it advanced with regard
to female witnesses in nonsexual offense prosecutions. 241 To the
contrary, a rape victim's credibility and competence were open to
attack solely because of the sexual nature of the crime. These same
evidentiary rules entitled a man accused of rape to subject his accuser
Reflecting the pervasive
to probing psychiatric examinations.
suspicion cast upon rape victims of the past, Professor Wigmore
recommended that probing examinations were necessary to
determine whether the victim suffered from some "mental or moral
delusion or tendency... causing distortion of the imagination in sex
cases."242 Thus, "in all charges of sex offenses, the complaining
witness [should] be required to be examined before trial by
for the purpose of ascertaining her probable
competent ' psychiatrists
credibility. 'z43
Feminists in search of reform criticized these legal standards as
perpetuating a cultural ideology fraught with distrust and contempt
for the female accuser. 244 Cross-examinations conducted by the
accused usually involved a searching inquiry into not only a woman's
chastity but also intimate details of her life including her adulterous
relationships, use of contraception, and illegitimate children. 245 The
inquisitorial nature of rape trials and compelled psychiatric
examinations deterred victims from reporting rape and ultimately
resulted in the under-enforcement of criminal laws. 246 Moreover,
prejudicial practices reinforced misconceptions among jurors who
nullified legitimate rape law to punish women deemed to be morally
undeserving. 247 Traditionally, juries attributed to the victim reasons
for lying and fabricating the rape charge including vindictiveness, fear
of being perceived as willingly sexual, and fear of pregnancy. 248 Thus,
jurors often found sufficient fault with the woman to avoid punishing
the rapist. 249
Eventually, as societal beliefs shifted to a less Victorian model of
female sexuality, chastity was rendered logically irrelevant and the
common law paradigm could no longer be justified. Prompted by
241. See Galvin, supra note 223, at 787; see also State v. Sibley, 33 S.W. 167, 171 (Mo.
1895) (conceding that what "destroys the standing [of women] in all the walks of life has
no effect whatever on the standing for truth" of men).
242. 3A J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 924a, at 747 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
243. Id.
244. See Galvin, supra note 223, at 791-93.

245. See id at 794.
246.
247.
248.
249.

See
See
See
See

id at 795-96.
idL at 800-01.
Orenstein, supra note 9, at 675-76.
id. at 673.
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feminist reformers and proponents of law enforcement, all but two
states and the federal government have enacted protective rape shield
legislation.250 While statutory provisions vary widely, all rape shield
laws create a presumption of inadmissibility by restricting inquiry into
a woman's past sexual behavior and character for chastity- 5 1 Federal

Rule of Evidence 412 provides an apt illustration of the modem view.
Rule 412, circumscribed only by express exceptions, renders sexual
predisposition or behavior evidence absolutely inadmissible. 252 The
prohibition excludes all forms of evidence including reputation and
opinion testimony, and evidence of specific acts. 253 The exclusionary
scope of Rule 412 is expansive insofar as it preempts other
evidentiary rules that would support admissibility. 254 Consequently,
as discussed below, a broad construction of rape shield prohibitions
substantially diminishes the Sixth Amendment right of the accused to
present exculpatory evidence.
B.

Sixth Amendment

Firmly rooted in our constitutional values, the opportunity to be
heard is an essential requirement of procedural fairness- 55 Whether
located directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses
of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal
defendants "a meaningful opportunity to present a complete
defense. '256 Indeed, the freedom to present critical exculpatory
250. See Hazelton, supra note 14, at 35-36 & n.2.
251. See GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 151-53
(3d ed. 1996).
252. FED. R. EVID. 412.
253. See LILLY, supra note 251, at 152.
254. See id. at 153-55; see also WEISSENBERGER'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE 168-69 (2d ed.
1995). The general prohibition facially precludes evidence proffered by the accused for
purposes of impeachment, and also overrides Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a) which
normally permits the accused to enter evidence of pertinent traits of the victim's character.
See FED. R. EVID. 412. Significantly, however, where excluding evidence would violate
the constitutional rights of the defendant, Rule 412 contains an exception to allow such
evidence. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(C). It is a rare occurrence when the exclusion of
relevant evidence comports with the Federal Rules and yet contravenes the Constitution.
Nevertheless, invoking countervailing constitutional principles, the Supreme Court has
recognized that notwithstanding rape shield prohibitions, evidentiary rulings that unduly
restrict the accused's ability to present evidence critical to his defense cannot be justified.
See Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 232-33 (1988) (holding that the accused was entitled
to establish the victim's bias and motive to fabricate even though the impeaching evidence
related to her sexual behavior).
255. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394
(1914).
256. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, _, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 1274 (1998) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (citing Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)).
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evidence constitutes a "fundamental element of due process of
law. ' '257 This core right protects the integrity of the adversarial
process, promotes fundamental fairness, and empowers the accused
to defend against the charges of the state.
Perhaps the liberty most significantly imperiled by rape shield
prohibitions is granted by the Compulsory Process Clause. The Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution provides that "the accused shall
enjoy the right.., to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor."258 The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged
that this basic right "is an essential attribute of the adversary system
itself." 259 Indeed, it is well established that few rights "are more
fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own
defense. '260 To ensure adversarial fairness, "the Framers of the
Constitution felt it necessary specifically to provide that defendants in
criminal cases should be provided the means of obtaining witnesses so
that their own evidence, as well as the prosecution's, might be
evaluated by the jury." 261 At bottom, the right of the accused to offer
the testimony of witnesses, to present his version of the facts to the
jury so that it may decide where the truth lies "is in plain terms the
' '262
right to present a defense.
A vital complement to compulsory process, the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment 263 constitutionalizes the right of the
accused "to make a defense as we know it. ' ' 264 Just as the accused has
the right to present his own witnesses in presenting a defense, he has
the right to confront the state's witnesses for the purposes of
challenging their testimony before the jury. 265 Characterized by the
Supreme Court as the "greatest legal engine ever invented for the
discovery of truth" the right of the accused to face-to-face
confrontation creates an opportunity for meaningful crossexamination and forms the core of the values embodied in the
Confrontation Clause.266 The elements of confrontation-physical
257. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14,19 (1967).
258. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
259. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408 (1988).
260. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,302 (1973); see also Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S.
95, 98 (1972) (per curiam).
261. Washington, 388 U.S. at 19-20.
262. Id.at 19.
263. The Constitution guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
enjoy the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend.
VI.
264. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975).
265. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14,18-19 (1967).
266. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156-58 (1970). The right guaranteed by the
Confrontation Clause includes not only a personal examination, but also:
(1) insures that the witness will give his statements under oath-thus impressing
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presence, oath, personal cross-examination, and observation of
demeanor by the trier of fact-combine to preserve the integrity of
the fact-finding process by ensuring that evidence admitted against
2 67
the accused is reliable and subjected to rigorous adversarial testing.
Indeed, the "mission of the Confrontation Clause is to advance a
practical concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining process in
criminal trials by assuring that 'the trier of fact [has] a satisfactory
268
basis for evaluating the truth of the [testimony]. '
While the right of the accused to present a complete defense is
fundamental, it is not absolute. 269 Specifically, the scope of the right
is circumscribed in two significant ways. First, the accused has no
right to present irrelevant evidence. 270
State evidentiary laws
excluding evidence deemed irrelevant, either judicially or
legislatively, do not offend the Constitution. 271 Second, even a
him with the seriousness of the matter and guarding against the lie by the
possibility of a penalty for perjury; (2) forces the witness to submit to crossexamination, the 'greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth':
[and] (3) permits the jury that is to decide the defendant's fate to observe the
demeanor of the witness in making his statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing
his credibility.
Id. at 158 (citation omitted).
267. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990) ("The central concern of the
Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal
defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding
before the trier of fact."); see also Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
Describing the historical foundation of the Confrontation Clause, the Court in Mattox v.
United States explained that:
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent
depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases,
being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and crossexamination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of
testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of
compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at
him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives
his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.
Id.
268. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970) (plurality opinion) (citing California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970)); see also Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739 (1987)
("[T]he right to confrontation is a functional one for the purpose of promoting reliability
in a criminal trial."); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986) ("The right to confront and to
cross-examine witnesses is primarily a functional right that promotes reliability in criminal
trials.").
269. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973).
270. See Wood v. Alaska, 957 F.2d 1544, 1549-50 (9th Cir. 1992) (recognizing that
where evidence is deemed irrelevant, the accused has no constitutional right to present it).
271. Arguably, legislative determinations of relevancy are facially unconstitutional to
the extent they preclude a case-by-case assessment of the defendant's factual
circumstances. However, the Supreme Court has flatly rejected this contention. See
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, __, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 1265-66 & n.7 (1998). In
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defendant's right to present legally relevant evidence may be

constitutionally proscribed by reasonable restrictions. 272 The Court

has consistently recognized that the right of the accused to offer
relevant evidence is not unlimited; rather, it must "bow to
accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial
process." 273 For example, in refusing to strike as unconstitutional a

per se exclusion of polygraph evidence offered by the accused, the
Court has observed that "state and federal rulemakers have broad

latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence
from criminal trials." 274 Similarly, to preclude the abrogation of
"virtually every hearsay exception" triggered by a literal reading of
the Confrontation Clause, the Court has conceded that under certain

narrow circumstances, "competing interests, if 'closely examined,'

considering a state evidentiary ban on polygraph evidence, the Court in Scheffer observed
that "[p]rior to Daubert, neither federal nor state courts found any Sixth Amendment
obstacle to the categorical rule. Nothing in Daubertforeclosed, as a constitutional matter,
perse exclusionary rules for certain types of expert or scientific evidence." Id. at 1265-66
n.7 (citation omitted). Therefore, logically relevant evidence cast as legally irrelevant, can
be constitutionally precluded. Nevertheless, the Court has acknowledged that while a law
may be facially valid, the Constitution requires an individualized inquiry into whether a
specific application of an exclusionary rule is permissible. See Craig,497 U.S. at 855 ("The
requisite finding of necessity must of course be a case-specific one: The trial court must
hear evidence and determine whether use of the one-way closed circuit television
procedure is necessary to protect the welfare of the particular child witness who seeks to
testify."); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012,1021 (1988) (reasoning that "[s]ince there ha[d] been
no individualized findings that these particular witnesses needed special protection, the
judgment here could not be sustained" and concluding that any exception to the accused's
right to confrontation would be allowed only when necessary to further important public
policy, which requires more than a mere showing of a generalized "legislatively imposed
presumption of trauma").
272. See Scheffer, 523 U.S. at
, 118 S.Ct. at 1264; Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55
(1987); Chambers,410 U.S. at 295.
273. Chambers,410 U.S. at 295. For example, state and federal evidentiary laws reflect
an undeniably legitimate interest in ensuring that only reliable evidence is presented to the
jury. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). Similarly,
relevant evidence may be constitutionally excluded or circumscribed in the name of
protecting a child witness from harassment or humiliation. See Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1982); el Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319 (1974).
Other legitimate interests capable of justifying exclusion of relevant evidence include
preserving the jury's role in making credibility determinations, minimizing collateral
litigation, and avoiding jury confusion and waste of time. See Scheffer, 523 U.S. at __, 118
S. Ct. at 1264-65; see also Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 151 (1991) (holding that
legitimate interests served by state notice requirement can justify precluding otherwise
relevant evidence of a prior sexual relationship between rape victim and the accused);
Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410-16 (1988) (declaring that the right to compulsory
process was not violated where the court precluded testimony of surprise witness offered
by the accused).
274. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at_, 118 S.Ct.at 1264.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol.49

may warrant dispensing with confrontation at trial. ' 275 Consequently,
a state's interest in the physical and psychological well-being of a
victim-witness may be sufficiently important in certain cases to
276
outweigh a defendant's rights under the Sixth Amendment.
Ultimately, however, the exclusion of evidence central to the
defendant's claim of innocence deprives the accused of his
fundamental right to have the state's case encounter and survive the
"'crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.' ' 277 Some state rules of
evidence may so "seriously impede the discovery of truth, 'as well as
the doing of justice,' that they preclude the 'meaningful opportunity
to present a complete defense' that is guaranteed by the
Consequently, abrogation of the accused's
Constitution. '278
fundamental right to compulsory process and confrontation will not
be tolerated in the absence of a valid state justification. In complying
with the admonition set forth in Rock v. Arkansas, restrictions on the
defendant's right to present a defense "may not be arbitrary or
disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve. ' 279 So
too "where constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment
of guilt are implicated, [an evidentiary] rule may not be applied
mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice. '280 Specifically, the
Court has held as unconstitutionally arbitrary or disproportionate, the
exclusion of relevant evidence where it has infringed upon a
sufficiently weighty interest of the accused. 281 The question thus
becomes whether the state's interests are powerful enough to justify
the categorical preclusion of otherwise relevant evidence offered by
the accused. This inquiry must be weighed against the strength of the

275. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1980) (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284, 295 (1973)); see also Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739-44 (1987) (holding
that where the accused had opportunity for full and effective cross-examination at trial,
right to confrontation was not violated when trial court refused to allow him to be present
during competency hearing of child witnesses); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51-54
(1987) (plurality opinion) (holding that the right of the accused to cross-examination was
not unconstitutionally abrogated where the state denied him access to investigative files);
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987) (holding as constitutional hearsay
statements of nontestifying co-conspirators admitted against the accused in absence of
opportunity for face-to-face confrontation); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986)
(same).
276. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 852 (1990).
277. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at -, 118 S. Ct. at 1275 n.16 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted); accord Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690-91 (1986); United States v. Cronic,
466 U.S. 648, 656-57 (1984).
278. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at __, 118 S. Ct. at 1274 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
279. 483 U.S. 44, 56 (1987).
280. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973).
281. See Rock, 483 U.S. at 58-61.
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282
defendant's interests in having evidence admitted in certain cases.

If such exclusion significantly undermines fundamental elements of
the accused's defense, a resounding "no" can be the only
constitutional response.
C. Constitutional Balancing

The admissibility of RTS by the accused in a rape prosecution
provides a novel and complex illustration of the inherent tension
between the Constitution and the state's broad latitude to establish

evidentiary rules in criminal trials and advance legitimate social
policy.

Seeking to defend themselves with the same scientific

evidence available to the state, those accused of rape increasingly
demand the right to present RTS testimony. Necessarily implicating

a woman's sexual behavior, defense-sponsored RTS evidence is
inadmissible under the expansive exclusionary provisions of rape

shield laws. As discussed in Part III, unrestricted use of RTS by the
accused foreshadows the revival of searching cross-examinations and

risks the resurrection of compelled psychiatric testing. However, by
invoking prosecutorial use of RTS, the state renders a woman's
sexual past logically relevant for the defense. Consequently, rape
shield laws that prevent the accused from presenting witnesses or
cross-examining the victim about prior sexual trauma substantially
circumscribe the ability of the accused to defend against the state's
charge.
Rape shield prohibitions reflect valid and substantial government
interests involving adversarial fairness and fact-finding integrity.
Implicitly balanced against the rights of the accused, these interests
are capable of justifying the abrogation of fundamental Sixth
Amendment guarantees. 283 Courts generally uphold rape shield
282. See Scheffer, 523 U.S. at ___ 118 S. Ct. at 1275-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Courts
also engage in a balancing of competing interests when determining the constitutionality
of limitations on a criminal defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation. See Maryland
v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850-51 (1990) (emphasizing that "a defendant's right to confront
accusatory witnesses may be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial
only where denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy"
and holding that a state's interest in the physical and psychological well-being of child
abuse victims may be sufficiently important to outweigh a defendant's right to face his
accusers); see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982) (sustaining as
constitutional legislation aimed at protecting the physical and emotional well-being of
youth "even when the laws have operated in the sensitive area of constitutionally
protected rights"); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)
(recognizing that a state's interest in "the protection of minor victims of sex crimes from
further trauma and embarrassment" is a "compelling" one).
283. See J. Alexander Tanford & Anthony J. Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and
the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 544, 554-60 (1980) (discussing the debate
surrounding the issue of precisely when the accused's right to due process mandates the
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restrictions as facially constitutional; however, an unprincipled
application may result in an unconstitutional denial of the accused's
fundamental right to present a meaningful defense. 284 As the Court
explained United States v. Scheffer, the relevant constitutional inquiry
focuses on whether rules precluding RTS evidence are "arbitrary or
disproportionate" to the interests they are designed to serve. 285
Ultimately, in balancing the rights of the accused against compelling
interests of the state, courts must establish whether circumscription of
the Sixth Amendment right to "present a defense as we know it" can
be justified by valid social policy.
(1) Logical Relevance
In determining whether or not a defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights are violated, a two-step analysis is performed. 286 First, courts
must inquire as to whether the excluded RTS evidence is relevant. 287
If it is not relevant, the accused enjoys no constitutional right to
present it. If it is relevant, the inquiry turns to whether legitimate
state interests outweigh the rights of the accused, or rather, whether
the implicated rights are sufficiently critical such that exclusion
288
cannot be justified.
Evidentiary exclusions embodied in rape shield laws are often
justified as reflecting a legislative determination that prior sexual
behavior is simply not logically relevant to whether a rape occurred.
Indeed, modern rape shield laws flatly reject the assumption, implicit
in the earlier common law, that evidence that a woman previously
consented to sexual relations with another is relevant to whether she
gave her consent to the accused on a particular occasion.2 8 9 Similarly
renounced is the previously well-entrenched myth that a woman's
chastity is relevant to her capacity to tell the truth. 290 Mirroring a
admissibility of sexual history evidence).
284. See Sandoval v. Acevedo, 996 F.2d 145, 149 (7th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that
although the Indiana rape shield law has been held facially constitutional, the
constitutionality of the law as applied to preclude particular exculpatory evidence requires
a case-by-case analysis). Notably, the Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the
constitutionality of substantive exclusionary provisions in state rape shield laws. Cf
Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 151 (1991).
285. 523 U.S. at -, 118 S.Ct. at 1264.
286. See Wood v. Alaska, 957 F.2d 1544, 1549-50 (9th Cir. 1992).
287. See id. at 1550.
288. See id.
289. See Galvin, supra note 223, at 798-800; see also Tanford & Bocchino. supra note
283, at 546-52; Frank Tuerkheimer, A Reassessment and Redefinition of Rape Shield Laws.
50 OHIO ST. L. J. 1245, 1250-54 (1989); John Lausch, Note, Stephens v. Miller: Tile Need
to Shield Rape Victims, Defend Accused Offenders, and Define a Workable Constitutional
Standard, 90 N.w. U. L. REV. 346, 356-58 (1995).
290. See Galvin, supra note 223, at 800 ("[E]ven if unchastity were a character flaw, it
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more balanced and accurate societal view of female sexuality, rape
shield legislation recasts as irrelevant prior sexual history evidence
offered to prove consent or credibility.291
It is well established that a defendant has no constitutional right
to present irrelevant evidence.292 Rather, the Sixth Amendment
extends protection only to logically relevant evidence. Insofar as a
woman's sexual behavior is deemed irrelevant to consent or
credibility, defense-sponsored RTS can be constitutionally excluded.
Relying on RTS to prove lack of consent, however, the state puts into
issue the victim's past sexual history. As discussed previously in Part
IV, RTS is incapable of conclusively determining that a particular
rape constitutes the source of traumatic injury. Thus, sexual behavior
evidence becomes logically relevant not to prove consent or challenge
credibility, but rather to establish identity or source of trauma. Put
another way, RTS proffered by the accused is relevant not to prove
the victim's character for unchastity, but to establish that someone
other than the accused could be criminally culpable.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly recognized in an
analogous context that the Constitution mandates the admissibility of
evidence offered for purposes of impeachment. In Olden v Kentucky,
the Court acknowledged that evidence bearing on the victim's sexual
behavior is admissible when proffered to establish a motive to
fabricate a charge of rape.293 In Olden, the accused sought to
introduce testimony regarding the victim's cohabitation with another
man.294 Presumptively inadmissible under rape shield laws, this
evidence was not offered to establish that the victim's character for
unchastity necessitated a finding of consent. Rather, it was offered to
of the constitutionally
function
prove bias, "a proper and important '29
5
protected right of cross-examination.
Extending the Court's reasoning in Olden to the RTS context,
admissibility of defense-sponsored RTS evidence offered for a valid
purpose, is not only relevant, it is constitutionally required. 296 If rape
has no relevance to general credibility. The limited use of sexual conduct evidence to
impeach only female witnesses in sexual offense prosecutions indicates that its relevance
was actually based on a sexist assumption that unchaste women will falsely charge rape.").
291. See id. at 798-99. "Because the decision to engage in consensual nonmarital sexual
activity is no longer a decision to defy conventional norms, the behavior is 'characterneutral' and does not support the inference 'if she strayed once, she'll stray again."' I.
Indeed, "[o]nce the notion of a character flaw is removed from the inferential process, the
mere fact that the complainant has previously engaged in consensual sexual activity
affords no basis for inferring consent on a later occasion." Id. at 799.
292. See Wood v. Alaska, 957 F.2d 1544,1549 (9th Cir. 1992).
293. 488 U.S. 227, 231-32 (1988).
294. Id. at 230.
295. Id. at 231 (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308,315-16 (1974)).
296. See, e.g., id. (emphasizing that "the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying
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shield laws are justified solely on grounds of relevance, unrestricted
admissibility of RTS rebuttal evidence to prove identity is arguably
uncontroversial. 297 Advanced by commentators advocating the
preservation of Sixth Amendment rights, the relevancy justification
appears meritorious. 298 However, this argument has been implicitly
rejected by Supreme Court decisions grounding the constitutionality
of rape shield laws in valid legislative policies, rather than rules of
299
relevance.
Upholding the constitutionality of an exclusionary notice
requirement, the Supreme Court in Michigan v. Lucas considered
whether the legitimate interests underlying that provision could ever

justify precluding evidence of a prior sexual relationship. 300 In
reversing, the Court concluded that the Michigan Court of Appeals
erred in adopting a per se rule that the state rape shield notice
provision violated the Sixth Amendment where it was employed to
preclude otherwise admissible evidence of past sexual conduct

between the victim and the accused. 301 According to the Court, Sixth

is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of crossexamination") (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17 (1974)); Tague v. Richards, 3
F.3d 1133, 1136-39 (7th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that the admission of evidence generally
excluded by rape shield laws may be constitutionally required where it is offered to prove
that the source of injury was not caused by the accused); Jeffries v. Nix, 912 F.2d 982, 98788 (8th Cir. 1990) (essentially refusing to find victim's sexual history relevant and
admissible in the absence of compelling evidence of modus operandi): United States v.
Kasto, 584 F.2d 268, 271 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1978) (noting that evidence of sexual activity may
be constitutionally required when the evidence explains a physical fact in issue at trial,
suggests bias or ulterior motive, or establishes a pattern of behavior clearly similar to the
conduct at issue); People v. Sandoval, 552 N.E.2d 726, 737-38 (I11.
1990) (recognizing that
prior pattern exception could apply to the admission of evidence that is relevant as tending
to show "signature").
297. See Williams v. State, 681 N.E.2d 195, 201 (Ind. 1997) (observing that many
jurisdictions acknowledge that rape shield laws serve to emphasize the general irrelevance
of a victim's sexual past and holding that admission of evidence offered not to show
consent but to establish some other point may be constitutionally required); State v.
Crims, 540 N.W.2d 860, 866-68 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (concluding that since the rape
shield statute reflects general irrelevance of a victim's sexual history it does not remove
relevant evidence from the jury's consideration).
298. See Galvin, supra note 223, at 902-05; Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 283, at 58990; see also Crims, 540 N.W.2d at 867 ("Viewed from this perspective, the statute's
relationship with the Constitution becomes one of harmony, not tension, because it serves
to remind the bench that the victim's sexual history is normally irrelevant in a sexual
assault prosecution.").
299. See Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 151 (1991).
300. Id.
301. See id. at 152 (conceding that the "Sixth Amendment is not so rigid" and
emphasizing that "'[t]he Sixth Amendment does not confer the right to present testimony
free from the legitimate demands of the adversarial system"') (citing United States v.
Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 241 (1975)).
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Amendment rights of the accused can be constitutionally limited by
the "valid legislative determination that rape victims deserve
heightened protection. '' 3°2 Indeed, to the extent Federal Rules of
Evidence 401 and 403 combine to provide an equally powerful
mechanism for excluding prejudicial evidence, Rule 412 is rendered a

redundancy. 30 3 Consequently, the analysis must proceed to step two.

(2) Balancingthe Interests
To the extent categorical preclusion of RTS operates to prevent

a criminal defendant from presenting relevant evidence, his ability to

confront adverse witnesses and present a defense is diminished. 3°4
Having established that RTS evidence offered by the accused is

logically and permissibly relevant, the inquiry now centers on whether
the accused's right to confront and cross-examine must bow to

accommodate legitimate state interests. 305 The sole question is
whether legitimate interests served by rape shield laws can
constitutionally justify the per se preclusion of defense-sponsored
RTS evidence. Following the admonition set out in Rock, restrictions
on the defendant's right to present a defense "may not be arbitrary '3or
06
disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.
While rape shield legislation serves several legitimate interests, the
blanket exclusion of RTS evidence offered by the accused constitutes

an arbitrary means to promoting those objectives. 307 Moreover, the
inability of the accused to present critical evidence significantly
undermines fundamental elements of his defense.
The exclusion

of prior sexual behavior advances several

compelling state interests rooted in social policy and adversarial

fairness.30 8 Even assuming sexual history is capable of being logically
302. ItL at 151; see also Stephens v. Miller, 13 F.3d 998, 1002 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Rape
shield statutes, like Indiana's, represent the valid legislative determination that victims of
rape and, as here, attempted rape deserve heightened protection against surprise,
harassment, and unnecessary invasions of privacy."); Wood v. Alaska, 957 F.2d 1544, 1551
(9th Cir. 1992) (noting that even though evidence is relevant, it may be constitutionally
excluded if its probative value is outweighed by other legitimate interests and stating that
"the Supreme Court has held that certain legitimate interests can justify excluding
evidence of a prior sexual relationship between a rape victim and a criminal defendant").
303. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 289, at 1271-73.
304. See Lucas, 500 U.S. at 149.
305. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,295 (1973).
306. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44,56 (1987).
307. Cf. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, _ 118 S. Ct. 1261,1264-65 (1998).
308. See State v. Gettier, 438 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 1989) (recognizing that the purposes
underlying federal rape shield legislation include: (1) protecting privacy of the victims; (2)
encouraging the reporting and prosecuting of sex offenses; and (3) preventing timeconsuming and distracting inquiry into collateral matters). Arguably, the interests
balanced against the rights of the accused weigh in favor of the victim, the state, and the
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relevant, rape shield exclusionary rules reflect a conclusive
determination that it can not be legally relevant. First, by precluding
evidence with a great potential for confusion and distraction,
exclusionary provisions of rape shield laws preserve the integrity of
the truth-finding process and promote fundamental fairness at trial.
Similarly, even where sexual behavior is remotely relevant, exclusion
is necessary to prevent prejudicial impact upon jurors who could
misinterpret evidence to conclude that a victim is morally
30 9
undeserving of the law's protection.
Second, rape shield laws advance legitimate social policy goals
external to, and at times, in direct conflict with, the truth-seeking
process at trial. Specifically, they are intended to "safeguard the
alleged victim against the invasion of privacy, potential
embarrassment and sexual stereotyping that is associated with public
disclosure of intimate sexual details. '310 The Supreme Court has
expressly recognized that rape shield laws represent "a valid
legislative determination that rape victims deserve heightened
protection against surprise, harassment, and unnecessary invasions of
privacy. ' 31
Consequently, modern rules of evidence encourage
victims of rape to institute and participate in the prosecution of
criminal sexual offenders, a substantial policy objective. 312 Finally,
rape shield prohibitions perform a significant, if not unintended,
educational function within the legal process. In determining which
facts are legally relevant, rape shield laws at once diminish societal
misconceptions about women and rape, and create a more judicious
evidentiary paradigm.
Here, however, the compelling interests embodied in rape shield
laws must give way to the right of the accused to put on a
constitutionally complete defense. 3 3
The fundamental issue
addressed by rape shield legislation involved the common law
practice that "'considered the victim's character for chastity pertinent
to whether or not she consented to the act that led to the charge of
accused. Presumably, all have an interest in preserving the integrity of the adversarial
process, ensuring fundamental fairness, and promoting fair and effective law enforcement.
309. See 124 CONG. REc. 34,913 (1978) (statement of Rep. Holtzman) (declaring that
the new rape shield law was essential to protect victims from being tried on the basis of
their moral worth); see also Galvin, supra note 223, at 794-95.
310. FED. R. EvID. 412 advisory committee's note.
311. Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1991).

312. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 289, at 1245-46 (asserting that one of the most serious
problems in the prosecution of rape cases is the "reluctance of victims of sexual assault to
complain, so that the criminal justice system ... is not even triggered into action"): Galvin.
supra note 223, at 795 (recognizing that women refuse to report rape out of fear of being
"twice traumatized": first by the rape, then by the system).
313. See Stephens v. Miller, 13 F.3d 998, 1011 (7th Cir. 1994) (Cummings, J..
dissenting).
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rape."' 3 4 Constituting a narrow exception to rape shield prohibitions,
defense use of RTS to rebut a charge of nonconsent neither seeks to
attack the victim's character nor is intended to address the question
of consent. 315 Rather, the exculpatory significance of RTS focuses on
proving that the victim's symptoms are attributable to an alternative
source of trauma. Consequently, limited use of RTS evidence does
not contravene adversarial fairness or the truth-seeking function of
exclusionary rules. 31 6 To the contrary, the state itself has a strong

interest in ensuring the reliability of scientific evidence proffered in
criminal trials. 31 7 However, the interest in evidentiary reliability also
weighs heavily in favor of the accused. 318 Arguably then, the
unqualified exclusion of defense-sponsored RTS is arbitrary to the
purposes rape shield was designed to serve.

That the revelation of prior sexual trauma would undoubtedly
engender anguish and embarrassment is indisputable. Equally clear,
however, is Supreme Court precedent suggesting that the limited

interest in minimizing embarrassment, standing alone, may not in
itself outweigh the accused's interest in presenting relevant evidence.
In Davis v. Alaska, the Court held that the state's interest in keeping

a witness's juvenile record private did not outweigh the defendant's

interest in producing relevant evidence.319 The Court refused to
challenge the legitimacy of the state's policy which sought to preserve

juvenile offender anonymity.3 20 Nevertheless, the Court forcefully

314. Id. at 1012 (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
315. See id.
316. Cf.Wood v. Alaska, 957 F.2d 1544, 1552 (9th Cir. 1992). Refusing to admit
evidence of the alleged victim's acting and modeling experience, the court recognized that:
Of significantly more import are the concerns, intrinsic to the truth-finding
process itself, that introducing the evidence would confuse the issues and unduly
prejudice the jury. Introducing [the] evidence.., would necessarily also
introduce evidence of several previous incidents of sex with others, as well as
evidence of exhibitionism. Because [the] experiences are not themselves
relevant, the jury could be led to base its decision on irrelevant facts.
Id.In Wood, the Ninth Circuit concluded that since "many people consider prostitution
and pornography to be particularly offensive, there is a significant possibility that jurors
would be influenced by their impression of [the complainant] as an immoral woman." Id
However, unlike the prejudicial evidence in Wood, evidence of woman's previous
traumatic experiences-sexual or not-does not necessarily engender the probability that
the jury "could feel hostility for her as an immoral woman" and thus "base its decision on
that hostility rather than on the actual facts of the case." Id.
317. See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S.303_ 118 S. Ct. 1261, 1265-66 (1998).
318. See State v. Maday, 507 N.W.2d 365, 369 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) ("Providing a
defendant with meaningful pretrial discovery underwrites the interest of the state in
guaranteeing that the quest for the truth will happen during a fair trial.").
319. 415 U.S. 308, 319 (1974).
320. See id. ("We do not and need not challenge the State's interest as a matter of its
own policy in the administration of criminal justice to seek to preserve the anonymity of a
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declared that "[w]hatever temporary embarrassment might result to
[the witness] or his family by disclosure of his juvenile record... is
outweighed by [the accused's] right to probe into the influence of
possible bias in the testimony of a crucial... witness. ' 321 In reaching
its conclusion, the Court emphasized that the "State could have
protected [the witness] from exposure... by refraining from using
him to make out its case." 322 Consequently, according to the Court,
"the State cannot, consistent with the right of confrontation, require
[the accused] to bear the full burden of vindicating the State's
323
interest."
Applying the reasoning set forth in Davis, that the victim may
suffer temporary embarrassment is insufficient, standing alone, to
justify blanket restrictions on critical constitutional rights. 324 To the
extent defense-sponsored RTS is limited to rebuttal use, a woman
theoretically retains the power to decide whether or not to subject
herself to a potentially embarrassing experience. It is, therefore,
fundamentally unfair to require the accused to bear the full burden of
vindicating the state's interest in insulating rape victims from the
adversarial process. Thus, the state's interest in allowing rape victims
"to testify free from embarrassment and with [their] reputation
unblemished must [under certain circumstances] fall before the right
of [the accused] to seek out the truth in the process of defending
325
himself."
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that the more
critical the excluded evidence to the defense of the accused, the more
important must be the asserted state interest. 326 Alternatively, the
juvenile offender.").
321. Id. This reasoning applies with equal force to the derivative state interest in
encouraging reporting. See Wood, 957 F.2d at 1552 (concluding that the limited interest in
encouraging reporting would not in itself outweigh the defendant's interest in presenting
relevant evidence).
322. Davis,415 U.S. at 320.
323. Id.
324. See Wood, 957 F.2d at 1552. Applying to rape cases the reasoning set out in Davis,
the Ninth Circuit has similarly concluded that the "embarrassment ... of having...
experiences revealed would be so minor.., that it cannot overcome [the accused's] right
to present relevant evidence." Id. Admittedly, extending the logic of Davis and Wood is
somewhat problematic in view of the fact that (1) Davis addressed the admissibility of
evidence offered to prove bias-a core function of the Confrontation Clause, and (2)
Wood analyzed the relative weight of evidence that was already public in nature-the
victim's modeling and acting experience. However, given the questionable validity of
RTS, and its probative, if not critical value when offered in rebuttal, limited use by the
accused is required by the Constitution.
325. Davis 415 U.S. at 320; see also Stephens v. Miller, 13 F.3d 998, 1011 (7th Cir. 1994)
(Cummings, J., dissenting).
326. See Stephens, 13 F.3d at 1020 (Ripple, J., dissenting) (citing Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 293-303 (1973)).
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evidence must be sufficiently central to the defense of the accused to
outweigh the legitimate state interests served by exclusion.32 7 The
criticality inquiry focuses on two factors: (1) the exculpatory
significance of the evidence offered by the accused; and (2) the
adequacy of the scope of cross-examination permitted. Employing an
outcome determinative test, the Court in United States v. ValenzuelaBernal pronounced that evidence is critical if it is relevant and "'vital
to the defense"' such that its exclusion could affect the outcome of a
trial. 328
"[W]here constitutional rights directly affecting the
ascertainment of guilt are implicated, [exclusionary rules] may not be
applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice." 32 9 "Indeed,
fundamental fairness mandates that the defendant be entitled to
present evidence that is central to the defense and inextricably
intertwined with the alleged criminal behavior." 330
The probative value of RTS offered by the accused to rebut the
state's use of the same renders it sufficiently critical to raise
constitutional concerns. As discussed previously in Part IV, that RTS
evidence is incapable of conclusively determining that a victim's
symptoms are attributable solely to rape is well established. When
the prosecution relies on RTS evidence to prove lack of consent, the
ability of the accused to establish ani alternative source of injury
constitutes a fundamental element of his defense. Nowhere is this
more essential than in cases where the prosecution, unable to produce
physical evidence, relies primarily upon RTS expert testimony.
Indeed, in the absence of convincing physical evidence, prosecutorial
use of RTS testimony can provide the "crucial link in the proof"
leveled against the accused. 331 Where the state's case is built upon a
foundation of logical inferences, the intrinsic reliability of basic facts
becomes vitally important to the accused. At bottom, where truth
and accuracy are necessary elements of a legitimate prosecution, the
"defendant cannot be denied the opportunity to elicit the core of
operative facts that comprise his theory of defense. ' 332 In a rape
prosecution, where the accused asserts a defense of consent, "this
essential center certainly would include.., the facts that ... diminish
the credibility of inculpatory evidence accumulated against [him]. ' 333
Consequently, in the context of RTS, when the reliability of critical
scientific facts is central to the ascertainment of guilt, competing state

327. See id at 1005-06 (Flaum, J., concurring).
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

458 U.S. 858, 867-68 (1982) (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14,16 (1967)).
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,302 (1973).
Stephens, 13 F.3d at 1018 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308,317 (1974).
Stephens, 13 F.3d at 1006 (7th Cir. 1994) (Flaum, J., concurring).
Id. (Flaum, J., concurring).

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol.49

interests must unquestionably yield to vital constitutional rights of the
334
accused.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of defense-sponsored RTS
evidence arises in the context of compelled psychiatric exams.
Probing clinical interviews represent a profound intrusion into the
privacy of the victim and strike at the heart of core rape shield values.
Indeed, the resurrection of compelled psychiatric examinations
conjures legitimate fears of invasive questioning and deeply felt
Refusing to jeopardize victim privacy, rape shield
exposure.
advocates may contend that even when the state relies on diagnostic
RTS evidence based on a personal interview with the victim, an
opportunity to discover the same evidence must be denied to the
of
defendant. Rather, the accused must be restricted to the use 335
argument.
and
cross-examination,
limited
experts,
nonexamining
While this position diminishes suffering endured by victims of rape,
such a substantial incursion fails to comport with the Constitution.
That the Constitution demands a contrary result is evident for
two reasons. First, psychological examinations used to refute the
state's proffer of RTS evidence are not sought to challenge victim
credibility or competence to testify. 336 Nor are they intended to
invoke destructive cultural myths about female sexuality or to reflect
upon the victim's moral worth. To the contrary, defense-sponsored
RTS offered solely for purposes of rebuttal, is employed to fairly and
legitimately defend against the state's charges. Offered for this
limited purpose, personal interviews conducted by an expert for the
accused do not implicate core rape shield values. Furthermore, where
the state invites such exposure, temporary embarrassment endured by
alone, to outweigh
victims of rape is probably not sufficient, standing
337
accused.
the
of
rights
constitutional
critical
such
Second, as described above, the ability of the accused to present
a complete defense is unconstitutionally circumscribed where he is
precluded from adequately rebutting the prosecutorial use of RTS
evidence. 338 In a 1959 case, the Supreme Court admonished that

334. Ironically, the interest in reliability, shared by both the state and the accused, tips
the balance in favor of the accused. Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly proclaimed
that "[t]he need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental
and comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were to
be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts." United States v. Nobles.
422 U.S. 225,230-31 (1975).
335. Cf. State v. Maday, 507 N.W.2d 365, 370-71 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).

336. See id. at 368 n.3.
337. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308,319 (1974).
338. See id. at 315 (finding that in balancing the relative constitutional interests, "the
essential question turns on [an] evaluation of the 'adequacy' of the scope of crossexamination" afforded to the accused).
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"where governmental action seriously injures an individual, and the
reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence
used to prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the
'339
individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue.
When denied access to evidence used by the state, the scope of crossexamination available to the accused may be insufficiently adequate
to vindicate his constitutional guarantees. Medical science deems
generalized expert testimony and the impersonal review of medical
records to be "poor and unsatisfactory substitutes for testimony based
upon prolonged and intimate interviews between the psychiatrist and
the defendant." 340 Indeed, "[m]ost psychiatrists would say that a
satisfactory opinion can only be formed after the witness has been
subjected to a clinical examination." 341
However, the Court has expressly recognized that "a State may
not legitimately assert an interest in maintenance of a strategic
advantage over the defense, if the result of that advantage is to cast a
pall on the accuracy of the verdict obtained." 342 Accuracy of the
verdict is a vital concern when, in the absence of more probative
physical proof, the state relies primarily on social science evidence.
Furthermore, "[c]onsistent with the adversarial nature of the factfinding process and the quasi-scientific nature of psychiatric opinion,"
the Supreme Court has rejected the contention that psychiatrists are
capable of reaching a "unanimous diagnosis" of a person's mental
condition.343 Indeed, it is critical to understand that "[p]sychiatry is
not.., an exact science, and psychiatrists disagree widely and
frequently on... the appropriate diagnosis to be attached to given
behavior and symptoms." 344 Consequently, when the accused is
precluded from presenting testimony of an examining expert when
the state is able to do so, the state enjoys a strategic advantage that
the accused cannot overcome.
"As the Supreme Court has reminded us on many occasions, the
basic function of the criminal trial is to find, even in the most complex

339. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474,496 (1959).
340. State v. Briand, 547 A.2d 235, 239 (N.H. 1988) (quoting United States v. Albright,
388 F.2d 719, 725 (4th Cir. 1968)). Recognizing that the accused waives her Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination when she relies upon battered woman
syndrome evidence based upon a personal interview, the court held that the accused may
be constitutionally compelled by the state to submit to a psychiatric examination. See iL
at 239-40.
341. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 44 at 167 (J. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
342. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68,79 (1985).
343. Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153,1157 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Ake v. Oklahoma,
470 U.S. 68 (1985)).
344. Ake, 470 U.S. at 81.
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and delicate of human situations, THE TRUTH. '345 The categorical
exclusion of RTS offered by the accused so seriously impedes the
discovery of truth, "as well as the doing of justice," that it forecloses
any "'meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense' that is
guaranteed by the Constitution. '346 Thus, the desire to shield rape
victims must under certain circumstances yield to another vital goal,
the accused's right to present his defense. 347 Indeed, "[s]ending the
innocent to jail, or depriving the guilty of due process, is not a price
our Constitution allows us to pay for the legitimate and worthy
ambition [of protecting] those already victimized from additional
suffering. '348 However, that the constitutional balance must preserve
core rape shield values and protect victims of rape from the
resurrection of compelled psychiatric examinations engendered in the
unfettered use of defense-sponsored RTS evidence is equally clear.
Striking a constitutional balance requires weighing the interests of the
349
victim against the rights of the accused on a case-by-case basis.
With this in mind, the following Part advances a general framework
of admissibility that reflects a constitutional balance between the law
and science of RTS, and the rights of the criminally accused.
V1. Framework of Admissibility
It is beyond question that evidence of RTS in a woman
victimized by rape is not conclusive proof that a rape occurred.
Nevertheless, a prosecutorial proffer of RTS serves a vital function in
the successful prosecution of rape cases and the vindication of victim
rights. In cases where there is a paucity of physical evidence, the
presence of identifiable psychological and somatic responses is highly
relevant as tending to show that a rape or some other traumatic event
occurred. Indeed, RTS may be the strongest evidence available to
the state when the accused advances a defense of consent. In
addition, RTS evidence plays a powerful role in educating the jury
about women's post-rape experiences. 3 0
When faced with
counterintuitive behaviors that they do not understand, juries can be
misled down the path of acquittal. Pervasive rape myths and
misconceptions can result in situations where juries discredit the

345. Stephens v. Miller, 13 F.3d 998, 1019 (7th Cir. 1994) (Ripple, J., dissenting).
346. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, _, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 1274 (1998) (Stevens,

J., dissenting) (citing Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)).
347. See Stephens, 13 F.3d at 1010-11 (Cummings, J., dissenting).

348. Id. at 1010 (Cummings, J., dissenting).
349. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 855 (1990) (holding that "[tihe requisite

finding of necessity must of course be a case-specific one").
350. See Orenstein, supra note 9, at 701-10; see also Clarke, supra note 9, at 274-79;
Massaro, supra note 31, at 402-10.
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victim and refuse to punish the rapist. By explaining the scope and
range of appropriate post-rape behavior, prosecution experts can
debunk myths about rape and its victims. 3 51 This educational function
of expert testimony provides a valuable opportunity to challenge
prejudicial views while equalizing the odds for a just result.
Consequently, RTS remains an essential arrow in the state's quiver
and victims of rape should not be deprived the benefit of its intended
use.
Equally clear is the realization that where the state has not first
opened the door, the absence of RTS in a woman victimized by rape
is insufficiently relevant to warrant admission by the accused. It is
well established that the accused enjoys no constitutional right to
present irrelevant evidence. Even marginally relevant evidence,
though otherwise unobjectionable, may nevertheless be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by principles of
adversarial fairness and legitimate social policy. As such, where the
state declines to introduce evidence of RTS, the right of the accused
to assert its absence is not critical to a constitutionally complete
defense.
RTS testimony is primarily relevant to explain the victim's
ostensibly unusual post-rape reactions. As described at length in Part
IV, women may react in vastly different ways to rape. 352

Some

women display few, if any, symptoms and may appear outwardly
unaffected. Others may not manifest any behavioral changes until
months after the incident. 353 Consequently, the absence of symptoms
consistent with RTS is of tangential relevance at best.35 4 In addition,

any modicum of probative value is substantially outweighed by the
probability that the jury will be misled by contentions that the victim
has failed to manifest a narrow range of symptoms associated with
351. See Orenstein, supranote 9, at 705-06.
352. See State v. Black, 745 P.2d 12, 16, 18 (Wash. 1987) (noting that RTS cannot be
used as proof of lack of consent because victims of rape may display one of two directly
conflicting emotional reactions: some display the outwardly emotional "expressed style"
others display a calm "controlled style" and still others display no symptoms at all).
353. See State v. Jones, 615 N.E.2d 713, 719 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992). Recognizing the
scientific indeterminacy inherent in RTS evidence, the court in Jones stated that:
Thus, the fact that an alleged rape victim has not manifested certain specific
symptoms of rape trauma syndrome is of little, if any, probative value, because it
may signify merely that this particular victim has not manifested those particular
symptoms at this stage of her recovery; she may yet show those symptoms, or she
may never show them, notwithstanding that she has, in fact, been raped.
Id.
354. See id.; see also State v. McQuillen, 689 P.2d 822, 830 (Kan. 1984) (precluding
defense-sponsored use of negative RTS on the theory that negative evidence has no
probative value because "[t]here are no statistics to show that there is any value to a
negative finding that the rape trauma syndrome is not exhibited by the alleged victim").
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RTS.355 Indeed, the jury may be tempted to conclude from the
absence of "typical" responses that the woman could not have been
raped, when it is possible that her symptoms have not manifested at
the time of trial, or that she is displaying a controlled or
356
asymptomatic style.
Finally, and perhaps most notably, precluding the ability of the
accused to introduce negative evidence of RTS preserves core rape
shield values. In contending that she fails to exhibit "appropriate"
post-rape behavior, negative RTS evidence represents an implicit
attack on victim credibility and competence. In light of its marginal
relevance and prejudicial impact, such an intrusion into the victim's
privacy contravenes legislative intent and cannot be justified.
Nevertheless, once the state elects to rely upon evidence of RTS,
the constitutional balance shifts irreversibly in favor of the accused.
That is, once the state opens the door, the right of the accused to
present RTS evidence of substantial equality constitutes 357
a
fundamental element of a constitutionally complete defense.
Under these circumstances, core constitutional values combine with
principles of adversarial fairness and fact-finding integrity to
substantially outweigh legitimate interests in victim privacy and
protection.
Where the state restricts its proffer to consistency testimony by a
nonexamining expert, a demand by the accused for a compelled
examination may be constitutionally denied. Theoretically, a
prosecutorial proffer of consistency testimony renders the victim's
sexual history relevant to the accused. However, unlike a diagnosis of
RTS, consistency testimony does not create a conclusive inference
that rape is the underlying source of trauma.
Consequently,
testimony that a woman's post-rape reactions are consistent with a
diagnosis of RTS should not open the door of inquiry into her own
sexual past.
Under these circumstances, balanced against significant state
interests, the right of the accused to a compelled examination is an
insufficiently critical element of his defense to justify admissibility.
355. See Jones, 615 N.E.2d at 719.
356. See id.
357. See State v. Wheeler, 602 N.E.2d. 826, 832-33 (Ill. 1992). This approach has won
acceptance in the context of battered woman syndrome evidence proffered by the accused
to support a claim of self-defense. See State v. Briand, 547 A.2d 235, 240 (N.H. 1988)
(holding that a criminal defendant waives her right to resist the state's request that she
submit to a court ordered psychiatric examination when she: (1) submits to a psychiatric
examination by her own experts; and (2) evinces an intention to rely on that testimony at
trial); cf State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793,799 (Minn. 1989) (recognizing that limiting the
scope of battered woman syndrome testimony to descriptive consistency testimony would
remove the need for state compelled psychiatric examinations of the accused).
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Indeed, restricting the accused to vigorous cross-examination of the
state's expert, through which the scientific infirmities of RTS can be
exposed, vindicates his right to defend against the state's charges with
evidence of substantial equality. While the accused is free to refute
whether the described symptoms are consistent with RTS in a
hypothetical victim, he may not subject the victim to searching
inquiry or compel a psychiatric examination. So long as the state
refrains from presenting particularized testimony, the constitutional
rights of the 358
accused are adequately honored and the victim's privacy
is preserved.
However, where the state relies on an RTS diagnosis from an
examining expert, the victim's sexual past becomes logically relevant
for the accused. As illustrated previously, the ability of the accused to
present a constitutionally complete defense is impermissibly
circumscribed where he is precluded from adequately rebutting the
prosecutorial use of RTS evidence. Implicit in a diagnosis of RTS is
the assertion that rape can be the only cause of a woman's symptoms.
Indeed, the conclusion that a woman suffers from RTS provides359
a
virtual verisimilitude on the critical issue of whether she was raped.
While the accused may concede that a woman manifests symptoms
consistent with RTS, he may, nevertheless, legitimately contend that a
prior rape, attempted rape, or nonsexual trauma, rather than the rape
for which he is charged, led to her present diagnosis.
Where the accused is precluded from examining the victim, he is
unable to adequately defend against powerfully incriminating
evidence. It is no argument to contend that the defendant's right to
compulsory process is adequately honored when he is forced to rebut
the state's examining witness by reviewing reports and observing
victim trial testimony.3 60 To the contrary, such a contention ignores
"the inherent qualitative differences between testimony from an
examining expert and a nonexamining expert. '361 Thus, to deny the
accused an opportunity to form an equally forceful defense based on
358. Significantly, the state, and in theory, the victim, retains the power to render the
woman's sexual past entirely irrelevant for the accused. By providing only general
consistency testimony rather than a diagnostic opinion, the victim need not submit to a
psychiatric examination by the state's expert. Through this seemingly formalistic
distinction, the prosecution can avoid opening the door to defendants who would assert a
right to compel victims to submit to an adverse psychiatric examination. See, e.g., Wheeler,
602 N.E.2d at 832; State v. Maday, 507 N.W.2d 365,372 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
359. See State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235,240 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
360. See Wheeler, 602 N.E.2d at 832. Nonverbal factors including posture and the
inability to make eye contact are also considered. See id.In addition, an examining expert
often bases her diagnosis on her own subjective interpretation of the victim's answers,
which may not be disclosed in the report made available to the accused. See id
361. I&
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an examination of the victim is to deprive him of a fundamentally fair
trial.
At base, when the state has the exclusive right to examine the
victim, the credibility of its expert is elevated above that of any
nonexamining expert the accused could call. 362 This creates a clear
advantage to the state in its efforts to prove a woman suffers from
RTS.363 However, as the Supreme Court has declared, "a State may
not legitimately assert an interest in maintenance of a strategic
advantage over the defense, if the result of that advantage is to cast a
pall on the accuracy of the verdict obtained."'364 The Constitution
guarantees to the criminally accused the right to present a fair and
complete defense in his own behalf; indeed, "[f]ew rights are more
fundamental. '365 A model that makes prosecutorial use of diagnostic
testimony contingent upon the ability of the accused to examine his
alleged victim reflects a fair balance between legitimate interests in
privacy and the constitutional rights of the accused.
Conclusion
In the absence of decisive judicial guidance, defendants will
continue to assert the right to proffer negative evidence of RTS, to
cross-examine victims concerning their sexual history, and to compel
probing adverse psychiatric examinations. In adopting a principled
solution to a vexing constitutional question, courts must carefully
evaluate the social science supporting RTS research, while balancing
legitimately protected privacy interests of rape victims against the
Sixth Amendment rights of the accused. An evidentiary framework
of admissibility that permits defendants to employ RTS evidence only
when the state first opens the door reflects a deliberate balancing of
these vital competing concerns. To the extent science is unable to
define with sufficient exactitude symptoms attributable solely to rape,
the victim's previous sexual history remains relevant to the accused.
Consequently, so long as social science cannot conclusively determine
that the cause of a woman's symptoms is the rape for which the
accused is charged, the defendant must be permitted to show that it is
not.

362.
363.
364.
365.

See id. at 833.
See id.
Id. (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 79 (1985)).
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973).

